Hastings Law Journal
Volume 63 | Issue 3

Article 1

3-2012

The Paranoid Style in Regulatory Reform
Jodi L. Short

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Jodi L. Short, The Paranoid Style in Regulatory Reform, 63 Hastings L.J. 633 (2012).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol63/iss3/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository.

Short_63-HLJ-633 (Do Not Delete)

3/26/2012 5:18 PM

Articles
The Paranoid Style in Regulatory Reform
Jodi L. Short*
The U.S. administrative state has been involved in a decades-long regulatory reform
project encompassing a shift away from what have been characterized as “commandand-control” approaches to regulation and toward approaches that are more market
oriented, managerial, participatory, and self-regulatory in their orientation. Through a
content analysis of the nearly 1400 law review articles that comprise the legal critique of
regulation between 1980 and 2005, I show that the most salient critiques of regulation
concern neither its cost nor its inefficiency, as many have assumed. Instead, they
express a deep-seated anxiety about the fundamentally coercive nature of
administrative government. In addition, I demonstrate that “voluntary” or “selfregulation” approaches that enlist regulated entities and citizens to perform core
governmental functions like standard setting, monitoring, and enforcement emerged
from the reform debate with particular prominence. Using both statistical and
interpretive inference, I argue that framing regulation as a problem of coercive state
power created a logic of governance uniquely suited to self-regulatory solutions that
promised noncoercive ways of governing. I situate my empirical analysis in historical
context, highlighting its continuities and discontinuities with the coercive- state rhetoric
that has infused debates about expanded federal governance throughout U.S. history: at
the Founding, during the New Deal, and in the postwar period. Drawing on these
empirical and historical analyses, I argue that proponents of government regulation
must recognize and engage the deep and abiding anxiety about state coercion. Before a
convincing and durable case can be made for any particular regulatory policy, a case
must be made for the state.

* Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. For generous reads and
insightful critiques on drafts of this Article, I thank Barry Adler, Bobby Ahdieh, Jennifer Arlen, Ed
Balleisen, Lisa Blomgren-Bingham, Bill Bratton, Laurie Edelman, Heidi Li Feldman, Neil Fligstein,
Brian Galle, Bob Kagan, Greg Klass, Don Langevoort, Kristin Luker, John Mikhail, Hamsa Murthy,
Jon Norman, Alvaro Santos, Jonathan Simon, and participants in the Georgetown Law Summer
Faculty Workshop and the New York University Law & Economics Colloquium. Abhi Raghunathan,
Michael Folger, Conor Larkin, Keigan Mull, Mary Greene, and Leslie Street provided invaluable
research assistance.

[633]

Short_63-HLJ-633 (Do Not Delete)

634

3/26/2012 5:18 PM

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 63:633

Table of Contents
Introduction................................................................................................ 634
I.
Conventional Understandings of Regulatory Reform ............ 639
II. Historical Roots of the Anti-Coercion Logic ............................. 643
A. Founding ................................................................................... 643
B. New Deal .................................................................................. 645
C. Postwar Period ........................................................................ 648
D. Postwar Economic Critiques of Regulation ..................... 650
1. The Costly State ................................................................... 650
2. The Captured State .............................................................. 652
3. The Cognitively Impaired State .......................................... 653
4. The Coercive State ............................................................... 654
III. The Logic of Command and Control ............................................. 656
IV. Empirical Study: The Legal Critique and Reform of
Command-and-Control Regulation .............................................. 662
A. Taxonomy of the Critiques .................................................... 662
B. Taxonomy of the Proposed Reforms .................................... 664
1. Deregulation......................................................................... 664
2. Liability-Based Regulation ................................................. 664
3. Market-Based Regulation ................................................... 665
4. Self-Regulation..................................................................... 666
C. Findings: Coercive-State Anxiety and the Rise of
Self-Regulation ...................................................................... 668
D. Late Twentieth-Century Regulatory Reform in
Historical Context ................................................................. 675
V. Discussion and Conclusion ............................................................. 678
Methodological Appendix ....................................................................... 683
A. Content Analysis as a Methodological Approach.......... 683
B. Constructing the Sample ....................................................... 684
C. Coding the Articles................................................................ 685

Introduction
The promise of the late twentieth-century regulatory reform
movement was a significantly deregulated polity in which the regulators
that remained would manage the risks of contemporary society more
efficiently and effectively, but four decades of regulatory reform have
produced a society that is neither significantly less regulated nor
significantly less risky. Recent economic and environmental catastrophes
have renewed calls for regulatory reform. As the U.S. opens a new
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conversation about regulation, this Article revisits the late twentiethcentury regulatory reform debate to uncover insights and cautions it
might hold for current and future efforts to reconceptualize the U.S.
regulatory state.
My contention in this Article is that current understandings of this
debate have failed fully to grasp what was and is at stake in regulatory
reform, which hampers efforts to design, implement, and even imagine
effective regulation. Scholarship assessing the meaning of late twentiethcentury regulatory reform tends to understand it as a part of the broader
assimilation of economic ideas and ideals into law and regulatory design,
reshaping regulatory policy by filtering it through the lens of economic
1
heuristics like marginal costs and efficiency. This is no doubt a central
theme in the regulatory reform story, but it has tended to dominate and
eclipse other narratives. Specifically, what this conventional account
2
tends to elide is the virulently anti-statist, often “tyrannophobic”
rhetoric that pervades elite academic discourse about regulation and that
coexists alongside arguments about regulatory efficiency and efficacy
even as it subtly undermines them. We have constructed a regulatory
reform discourse that is antithetical to the very idea of government
regulation.
This Article seeks to demonstrate how rhetoric about state coercion
shaped the late twentieth-century debate about regulatory reform in the
legal academy and to situate this contemporary debate in the ongoing
historical dialogue about regulation in the United States. American
political rhetoric about government regulation, particularly federal
regulation, has long conflated regulation and tyranny. Each arguable
expansion of federal government power has met with resistance on the
ground that it will lead to authoritarian rule. At the Constitutional
Convention, Anti-Federalists argued that the proposed document would
create a “new King” with “powers exceeding those of the most despotic
3
monarch we know of in modern times.” Battles over New Deal

1. See, e.g., Lisa Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs of Mythic Proportions, 107 Yale L.J. 1981, 1983
(1998) (noting the centrality of cost-benefit arguments to debates about regulatory reform); Richard
H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 3 (1995)
(characterizing significant regulatory reforms as motivated by cost and efficiency considerations);
Sidney Shapiro, Pragmatic Administrative Law, Issues in Legal Scholarship, Mar. 2005, article 1, at 1
(characterizing regulatory reform as being principally concerned with “unnecessary and unduly costly
regulations”); Rena I. Stienzor, Reinventing Environmental Regulation: The Dangerous Journey from
Command to Self-Control, 22 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 103, 112 (1998) (characterizing the regulatory
reform critique as one concerned principally with economic efficiency and agency incompetence
(which can be taken as a specific instance of inefficiency)). See generally John L. Kelley, Bringing
the Market Back In: The Political Revitalization of Market Liberalism (1997).
2. Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Tyrannophobia 8 (Univ. of Chi. Public Law Working
Paper No. 276, Harvard Univ. Public Law Working Paper No. 09-44, 2009), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1473858.
3. Isaac Kramnick, Introduction to The Federalist Papers 34 (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987).
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administrative reform were framed at the time as a “righteous fight to
4
defend democracy from dictatorship.” World War II and the Cold War
that followed “pushed a fear of totalitarianism . . . to the center of
5
American political thought” and deeply influenced thinking about the
6
appropriate role of the state as a regulator.
Postwar economic thought, which formed the intellectual basis of
late twentieth-century regulatory reform debates, suggested the
possibility of a new approach to thinking about the state’s role as a
regulator—an approach informed by rational, empirical analysis of the
circumstances under which government regulation could most efficiently
and effectively promote public goals. This literature was dominated by
cost- and efficiency-based critiques of regulation inspired by Ronald
Coase and aimed largely at improving regulation’s target selection and
7
design. But like their intellectual contemporaries, postwar economists
had their own dark visions of state power. Different strands of the
economic literature saw a regulatory state that was not only costly or
inefficient, but that was captured by the industries it was supposed to
regulate, cognitively incapable of gathering enough information to
regulate coherently, and downright coercive: the equivalent of
authoritarian institutions “from fascism to communism and from
8
socialism to serfdom.”
This Article is about how these economic ideas were assimilated
into mainstream legal critiques of regulation in the late twentieth
century. The centerpiece of the Article is a rigorous content analysis of
the nearly 1400 law review articles on command-and-control regulation
that appeared between 1980 and 2005, which generates two key findings.
First, I demonstrate that concerns about the coercive nature of
administrative government pervade the late twentieth-century legalacademic dialogue about regulation and that these critiques rival
concerns about the cost and inefficiency of regulation. Second, I
document the rise of voluntary or “self” regulation over the course of
this debate to become the most widely discussed reform in the
mainstream legal literature. I argue that framing regulation as a problem
of coercive state power created a logic of governance uniquely suited to
self-regulatory solutions that promised noncoercive ways of governing. I

4. George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative Procedure Act Emerges from
New Deal Politics, 90 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1557, 1593 (1996).
5. Alan Brinkley, Liberalism and Its Discontents 86 (1998).
6. Id.
7. See generally J.H. Dales, Pollution, Property & Prices (1968) (developing an early
pollution-trading model); Allen V. Kneese & Charles L. Schultze, Pollution, Prices, and Public
Policy (1975) (advocating pollution taxes); R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & Econ. 1
(1960).
8. Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson, The Illusion of Law: The Legitimating Schemas of Modern
Policy and Corporate Law, 103 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 105 (2004).
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argue that proponents of government regulation must recognize and
engage this deep-seated anxiety about state coercion. Before a
convincing and durable case can be made for any particular regulatory
program or policy, a case must be made for the state.
There are already countless well-told stories about regulatory
9
reform: those making a case for it, those assessing its political and
10
historical impact and import, and those analyzing and evaluating myriad
11
particular reforms. I do not purport to reprise those stories here. This

9. See generally Eugene Bardach & Robert A. Kagan, Going by the Book: The Problem of
Regulatory Unreasonableness (1982); Stephen Breyer, Regulation and Its Reform (1982); James
F. Gatti, The Limits of Government Regulation (1981); Kneese & Schultze, supra note 7; Robert
E. Litan & William D. Nordhaus, Reforming Federal Regulation (1983); George J. Stigler, The
Citizen and the State: Essays on Regulation (1975); James Q. Wilson, The Politics of
Regulation (1980); Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law,
37 Stan. L. Rev. 1333 (1985); Pildes & Sunstein, supra note 1; Richard B. Stewart, Regulation,
Innovation and Administrative Law: A Conceptual Framework, 69 Calif. L. Rev. 1256 (1981).
10. See generally Marc Allen Eisner, Regulatory Politics in Transition (1993); Richard A.
Harris & Sidney M. Milkis, The Politics of Regulatory Change: A Tale of Two Agencies (1989);
Douglas A. Kysar, Regulating from Nowhere: Environmental Law and the Search for
Objectivity (2010); Regulatory Reform: What Actually Happened (Leonard W. Weiss & Michael
W. Klass eds., 1986); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Rethinking the Progressive Agenda: The Reform of
the American Regulatory State (1992); Cary Coglianese, The Rhetoric and Reality of Regulatory
Reform, 25 Yale J. on Reg. 85 (2008); Richard D. Cudahy, The Coming Demise of Deregulation II,
61 Admin. L. Rev. 543 (2009); David M. Driesen, Distributing the Costs of Environmental, Health, and
Safety Protection: The Feasibility Principle, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and Regulatory Reform, 32 B.C.
Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 1 (2005) [hereinafter Driesen, Feasibility Principle]; David M. Driesen, Regulatory
Reform: The New Lochnerism?, 36 Envtl. L. 603 (2006) [hereinafter Driesen, New Lochnerism];
Daniel A. Farber, Rethinking Regulatory Reform After American Trucking, 23 Pace L. Rev. 43 (2002);
Michael Fix & George C. Eads, The Prospects for Regulatory Reform: The Legacy of Reagan’s First
Term, 2 Yale J. on Reg. 293 (1985); Robert W. Hahn et al., Environmental Regulation in the 1990s: A
Retrospective Analysis, 27 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 377 (2003); Lisa Heinzerling, Reductionist Regulatory
Reform, 8 Fordham Envtl. L. Rev. 459 (1996); Jacint Jordana & David Levi-Faur, The Politics of
Regulation in the Age of Governance, in The Politics of Regulation: Institutions and Regulatory
Reforms for the Age of Governance 1 (Jacint Jordana & David Levi-Faur eds., 2004); Alfred E.
Kahn, Deregulation: Looking Backward and Looking Forward, 7 Yale J. on Reg. 325 (1990); Jerry L.
Mashaw, Reinventing Government and Regulatory Reform: Studies in the Neglect and Abuse of
Administrative Law, 57 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 405 (1996); Thomas O. McGarity, Our Science Is Sound
Science and Their Science Is Junk Science: Science-Based Strategies for Avoiding Accountability and
Responsibility for Risk-Producing Products and Activities, 52 Kan. L. Rev. 897 (2004); Thomas O.
McGarity, Regulatory Reform and the Positive State: An Historical Overview, 38 Admin. L. Rev. 399
(1986) [hereinafter McGarity, Positive State]; Thomas O. McGarity, Regulatory Reform in the Reagan
Era, 45 Md. L. Rev. 253 (1986) [hereinafter McGarity, Reagan Era]; Robert L. Rabin, Federal
Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 Stan. L. Rev. 1189 (1986); Marianne K. Smythe, An Irreverent
Look at Regulatory Reform, 38 Admin. L. Rev. 451 (1986); David B. Spence & Lekha Gopalakrishnan,
Bargaining Theory and Regulatory Reform: The Political Logic of Inefficient Regulation, 53 Vand. L.
Rev. 597 (2000); Leonard W. Weiss, Introduction: The Regulatory Reform Movement, in Regulatory
Reform: What Actually Happened 1 (Leonard W. Weiss & Michael W. Klass eds., 1986).
11. See generally John C. Coates, The Goals and Promise of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 21 J. Econ.
Perspectives 91 (2007) (arguing that Sarbanes-Oxley will bring long term net benefits, but needs
effective enforcement strategies and oversight from administrative bodies); Joseph Goffman, Title IV
of the Clean Air Act: Lessons for Success of the Acid Rain Emissions Trading Program, 14 Penn St.
Envtl. L. Rev. 177 (2006) (arguing that the first fifteen years of the emissions-trading program, a part
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Article presents neither a history nor an evaluation of regulatory reform,
12
but rather a genealogy tracing how current practices and understandings
of regulation are rooted in the historical construction of regulation as a
problem. I adopt an innovative methodological approach that generates
important new insights about regulatory reform. Through a content
13
analysis of the legal critique of regulation, I demonstrate the prevalence
of state-coercion arguments within regulatory reform discourse, the rise
of self-regulation from within this same discourse, and the connection
between the two. My findings suggest that legal academics came to see
regulation as a particular kind of problem—a problem of state
coercion—and this channeled legal-academic dialogue about reform
toward particular kinds of solutions, notably those that promised
noncoercive ways of governing. I argue that framing regulatory problems
and solutions in this way has undermined rational consideration of the
full range of regulatory alternatives, particularly those that entail an
active role for the state, and that this has hobbled efforts to regulate
effectively.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I sets forth the prevailing
understanding of regulatory reform as the extension of economic
rationality, and specifically the rationality of efficiency, to regulatory
of the Clean Air Act, have been largely successful); Dennis D. Hirsch, Project XL and the Special
Case: The EPA’s Untold Success Story, 26 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 219 (2001) (arguing that the success of
the XL program can be seen by its adaptation to the “special case”); Robert Innes & Abdoul G. Sam,
Voluntary Pollution Reductions and the Enforcement of Environmental Law: An Empirical Study of
the 33/50 Program, 51 J.L. & Econ. 271 (2008) (arguing that the 33/50 program has encouraged
pollutant reductions in states with larger environmental constituencies); Brett H. McDonnell, SOX
Appeals, 2004 Mich. St. L. Rev. 505, 509 (concluding that Sarbanes-Oxley is helping to improve
corporate governance because it has “induced better-informed regulators and private actors to take
action’’); Bruce M. Owen, Regulatory Reform: The Telecommunications Act of 1996 and the FCC
Media Ownership Rules, 2003 Mich. St. L. Rev. 671 (arguing that many of the rules adopted in the
wake of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 are unnecessary and duplicative); Sidney A. Shapiro &
Randy S. Rabinowitz, Punishment Versus Cooperation in Regulatory Enforcement: A Case Study of
OSHA, 49 Admin. L. Rev. 713 (1997) (concluding that OSHA’s experience confirms the importance of
cooperation and punishment in regulatory enforcement); Lawrence E. Susskind & Joshua Secunda,
The Risks and the Advantages of Agency Discretion: Evidence from EPA’s Project XL, 17 UCLA J.
Envtl. L. & Pol’y 67 (1998) (arguing that the implementation of Project XL has faced numerous
obstacles in the efforts to adopt more flexible approaches to environmental regulation).
12. For purposes of this Article, I use the term genealogy to describe an analytic framework that
examines how discourses evolve over time and how they constitute the subjects they purport merely to
analyze. This is a shorthand definition, suited to the task at hand, that does not engage the many
complex methodological and normative implications of genealogical practice. See, e.g., Michel
Foucault, Nietzsche, Genealogy & History, in Language, Counter-Memory, Practice 139 (D.
Bouchard ed., 1977); Michel Foucault, The Discourse on Language, in The Archaeology of
Knowledge 215 (Michel Foucault ed., 1972).
13. Please see the Methodological Appendix to this Article for a detailed description of content
analysis generally and my application of it here. I am aware of only one other content analysis of
regulatory reform discourse, conducted on a much smaller sample of texts and confined to the
environmental field. See Timothy F. Malloy, The Social Construction of Regulation: Lessons from the
War Against Command and Control, 58 Buff. L. Rev. 267 (2010).
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policymaking. I characterize this narrative as one about a shift in the
“logic” of regulation, but one that fails to account for other logics driving
the debate about regulatory reform: specifically, anti-coercion logics.
Part II documents the prevalence of anti-coercion logics in key historical
debates about the expansion of government regulation: at the Founding,
during the New Deal, and in the postwar periods. It outlines in greater
detail the different conceptions of the state that emerged from the
postwar economic literature, specifically the “costly state,” the “captured
state,” the “cognitively impaired state,” and the “coercive state.” Part III
describes and justifies the setting for my study, the late twentieth-century
legal critique of regulation; introduces the logic of “command and
control” organizing this debate; and provides a brief genealogy of that
term. In Part IV, I present my empirical analysis of the legal critique of
command-and-control regulation. I lay out a taxonomy of the various
arguments deployed in this critique, as well as the reforms considered,
and I present the results of my analysis, documenting the dominance of
“coercion” arguments in the legal critique of regulation and the rise of
self-regulation over the life of the sample. I conclude in Part V by
discussing my findings, their historical significance, and the
contemporary implications of designing regulation around the fear of a
coercive state.

I. Conventional Understandings of Regulatory Reform
14
The late twentieth-century regulatory reform movement was a
response to the expansion of economic and social regulation that
occurred during the New Deal and postwar periods, respectively. It
sought to deregulate markets that were tightly controlled by the
government, such as airlines and trucking, and to blunt the impact of
social regulation, especially in the fields of health, safety, and
environmental protection, by subjecting it to skeptical regulatory
analysis. The roots of regulatory reform can be traced to postwar
15
economic critiques of regulation, but the movement gathered steam and
political prominence in the 1970s, as it linked the nation’s poor economic
16
performance to the onerous regulatory burdens borne by business.
Presidents Ford and Carter made important contributions to the
regulatory reform project, establishing mechanisms for review and

14. While the term “regulatory reform” has been used by some to describe the proregulatory
mobilizations that occurred in the New Deal and postwar periods as well as ongoing contemporary
efforts to reform regulation, it more commonly refers to the deregulation and related regulatory
reform efforts that occurred from roughly the 1970s into the twenty-first century. Unless otherwise
indicated, I use the term in the Article to refer to this historically specific regulatory reform effort.
15. See infra Part IV.C.
16. See George C. Eads & Michael Fix, Relief or Reform? Reagan’s Regulatory Dilemma 17
(1984).
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analysis of agency decisions, urging agencies to consider the economic
implications of their actions, and deregulating major sectors of the
17
economy. But it was Ronald Reagan who made regulatory reform a
touchstone of his presidential campaign and a foundational pillar of his
18
economic agenda. In office, President Reagan pursued a policy of
“regulatory relief,” taking steps to scale back regulatory burdens on
19
businesses and consumers. He also enacted reforms to the regulatory
process, the most prominent of which was Executive Order 12291, which
consolidated regulatory oversight in the executive Office of Management
and Budget and required agencies to justify proposed rules on the basis
20
of the relative costs and benefits they were expected to generate. The
1990s produced a second wave of regulatory reform. President Clinton
initiated a drive to “reinvent government,” launching a top-to-bottom
review of agency practices designed “to make government work better
21
and cost less.” His Republican rivals in Congress included competing
regulatory reform provisions in their Contract with America that would
have required more sweeping and stringent cost-benefit analysis of new
regulatory actions and imposed additional procedural burdens on
22
agencies to slow the flow of regulation. Although these policies were
not enacted, cutting costs and relieving regulatory burdens remained the
lodestars of regulatory policy into the twenty-first century.
Scholarship assessing the broader significance of regulatory reform
23
has tended to coalesce around a “familiar script” that portrays it, for
good or for ill, as the extension of economic rationality to regulatory
policymaking. As Marc Eisner argues in his comprehensive history of
regulatory politics, the regulatory reform movement of the 1970s and
1980s established an “efficiency regime,” which was “based on a return
to the market, and the supremacy of economics in regulatory decision24
making.” Numerous scholars have observed that regulatory reform
25
prompted agencies to adopt an economic approach to regulation,

17. Id. at 1, 69–75; Weiss, supra note 10, at 10–12.
18. Eads & Fix, supra note 16, at 1; McGarity, Reagan Era, supra note 10, at 261.
19. Eads & Fix, supra note 16, at 1.
20. Id.; McGarity, Reagan Era, supra note 10, at 265–67.
21. Albert Gore, Nat’l Performance Review, From Red Tape to Results: Creating a
Government that Works Better & Costs Less, at i (1993).
22. Steven P. Croley, The Administrative Procedure Act and Regulatory Reform: A Reconciliation,
10 Admin. L. Rev. Am. U. 35, 43 n.47 (1996); Ronald M. Levin, Administrative Procedure Legislation
in 1946 and 1996: Should We Be Jubilant at this Jubilee?, 10 Admin. L. Rev. Am. U. 55, 59 (1996).
23. Kysar, supra note 10, at 1.
24. Eisner, supra note 10, at 133.
25. See generally Eisner, supra note 10; Kysar, supra note 10; Driesen, New Lochnerism, supra
note 10; Hahn et al., supra note 10; Malloy, supra note 13; Mashaw, supra note 10; Jerry L. Mashaw,
Structuring a “Dense Complexity”: Accountability and the Project of Administrative Law, Issues in
Legal Scholarship, Mar. 2005, article 4; McGarity, Reagan Era, supra note 10; Spence &
Gopalakrishnan, supra note 10; Weiss, supra note 10.
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meaning that regulators now looked to economic concepts like marginal
costs and efficiency to rationalize regulatory decisionmaking and to
26
discipline the unruly “excesses of [their] early attempts to regulate.”
Even the most recent and systematic analyses of the regulatory reform
debate conclude that it was driven by concerns about economic
27
efficiency.
In the conventional narrative, cost-benefit analysis (“CBA”), an
approach that requires agencies to analyze proposed regulations by
quantifying and comparing the magnitude of the costs and benefits those
regulations are expected to yield, has come to be seen as the
embodiment of the economic approach to regulation and the crowning
28
policy achievement of regulatory reform. Surveying his own efforts as a
regulatory reformer, John Graham identifies CBA as the mechanism by
29
which “reformers gained ground.” Thomas McGarity concurs that CBA
was the most fully realized of all the goals of the regulatory reform
30
movement. Douglas Kysar suggests that CBA now “provides our
31
übernorm for public policy making.” And Cass Sunstein has
32
pronounced that we live in a “Cost-Benefit State.” The association
between CBA and regulatory reform has become so taken for granted
33
that many scholars conflate the two or refer to them interchangeably.
Perhaps the most telling evidence of CBA’s influence is that proponents
of regulation tend to assume that the arguments they need to meet or
counter are arguments about the costs, benefits, and efficiency of a given
34
regulatory scheme.
The significance of CBA went far beyond the analytic demands it
placed on agencies. It was, as McGarity argues, a “cognitive reform”
designed to change fundamentally the way regulators defined the
35
possibilities and limitations of regulation. CBA created a framework
26. Kysar, supra note 10, at 1.
27. Malloy, supra note 13, at 289–92.
28. See generally Eisner, supra note 10; Kysar, supra note 10; Thomas O. McGarity,
Reinventing Rationality: The Role of Regulatory Analysis in the Federal Bureaucracy (1991);
McGarity, Positive State, supra note 10; McGarity, Reagan Era, supra note 10.
29. John D. Graham, Saving Lives Through Administrative Law and Economics, 157 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 395, 401 (2008).
30. McGarity, supra note 28, at xvi.
31. Kysar, supra note 10, at 15.
32. Cass R. Sunstein, The Cost-Benefit State ix (2002).
33. See generally Coglianese, supra note 10; Driesen, Feasibility Principle, supra note 10; Farber,
supra note 10; Heinzerling, supra note 10; David A. Rice, Consumer Unfairness at the FTC:
Misadventures in Law and Economics, 52 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1 (1983).
34. See, e.g., Richard L. Revesz & Michael A. Livermore, Retaking Rationality: How CostBenefit Analysis Can Better Protect the Environment and Our Health 3 (2008); Thomas O.
McGarity & Sidney A. Shapiro, OSHA’s Critics and Regulatory Reform, 31 Wake Forest L. Rev. 587,
587 (1996).
35. Thomas O. McGarity, The Expanded Debate over the Future of the Regulatory State,
63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1463, 1493 (1996).
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that permitted consideration of quantifiable variables like the costs of
implementation but that marginalized consideration of unquantifiable
36
variables like justice or fairness. It moved regulators away from broad
considerations of whether a given policy served the public interest to
quantitative analysis of whether that policy’s monetizable benefits
exceeded its expected costs. This required regulators not only to justify
regulation very differently than they had before, but literally to think
about regulation very differently than they had before. In this way, CBA
changed the logic of regulation, not merely the procedures by which it
was enacted.
Social scientists refer to the cognitive frameworks that shape
individual and collective decisionmaking as “logics.” A logic is a set of
practices and ideas that supplies the organizing principles for a given
37
institution or social arrangement. Logics are “socially shared, deeply
held assumptions and values that form a framework for reasoning [and]
38
provide criteria for legitimacy.” They provide the building blocks of
individual thought and collective action and, in this way, they shape and
39
constrain what it is possible to think and what it is possible to do. Social
spaces are typically governed by multiple, overlapping, and often
40
conflicting logics. For instance, logics of the capitalist market, the
bureaucratic state, democracy, the family, and Christianity all operate
powerfully in the U.S., even as they are sometimes at odds with one
another. This multiplicity creates a kind of social dynamism by making
available multiple frameworks in which individuals can understand and
41
justify their actions and coordinate with others.
Robert Baldwin and Julia Black have argued that “regulatory
42
logics” are an underappreciated problem in regulatory design.

36. I am presenting here the conventional account of the significance of CBA and the impact it
had on regulatory policymaking. Note that some scholars have argued that CBA can be made to
encompass seemingly nonquantifiable variables, like quality of life or existence value. See, e.g., Revesz
& Livermore, supra note 34, at 12–13 (arguing for a statistical understanding of compassion that can be
realized through CBA); see also Heidi Li Feldman, Loss, 35 N.M. L. Rev. 375, 375–76 (2005) (arguing
that there is no basis in economic theory for precluding intangible harms from welfare calculations).
37. Roger Friedland & Robert R. Alford, Bringing Society Back In: Symbols, Practices, and
Institutional Contradictions, in The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis 232, 232
(Walter W. Powell & Paul J. DiMaggio eds., 1991).
38. Mary B. Dunn & Candace Jones, Institutional Logics and Institutional Pluralism: The
Contestation of Care and Science Logics in Medical Education, 1967–2005, 55 Admin. Sci. Q. 114, 114
(2010).
39. See, e.g., Mary Douglas, How Institutions Think 61–63 (1986); Friedland & Alford, supra
note 37; Ann Swidler, Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies, 51 Am. Soc. Rev. 273, 278–79 (1996).
40. Luc Boltanski & Laurent Thévenot, On Justification: Economies of Worth (Catherine
Porter trans., 2006); Friedland & Alford, supra note 37, at 232.
41. Friedland & Alford, supra note 37.
42. Robert Baldwin & Julia Black, Really Responsive Regulation 1, 15 (London Sch. of Econ.
Law, Soc’y and Econ., Working Paper 15, 2007), available at www.lse.ac.uk/collections/law/wps/
wps.htm; see also Edward Rubin, The Myth of Accountability and the Anti-Administrative Impulse,
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A “regulatory logic” embodies a set of understandings, assumptions, and
predictions about how regulators and regulated entities behave, how they
interact with the regulatory institutions in which they are embedded, and
how they will respond to certain regulatory interventions. It constructs
regulators and regulated entities as particular kinds of subjects, with
particular kinds of interests and incentive structures. Baldwin and Black
argue that the efficacy of a regulatory system depends in part on the
43
accuracy of the assumptions reflected in its “regulatory logic.”
The gist of the conventional account of late twentieth-century
regulatory reform is that it shifted the logic of regulation, replacing old
logics like justice, fairness, precaution, and the aspiration to regulate in
the public interest, with the economic logic of cost and efficiency. There
is no doubt that this account captures something essential about
regulatory reform. My argument is not that the conventional account is
wrong, but that it is incomplete. The relentless focus on the economic
logic of regulation has elided other key logics operating in the debate
about regulatory reform, including the ongoing salience of coercive-state
anxiety. It is important to recognize the parallel logic of anti-coercion
because, like the economic logic, it shapes how policymakers and citizens
think about regulation, its possibilities, and its limitations. Moreover, it
also potentially contradicts and undermines the logic of efficient
regulation.

II. Historical Roots of the Anti-Coercion Logic
A. Founding
A deep-seated anti-coercion logic has shaped conceptions of
44
American identity and governance from the nation’s earliest days. The
threat of tyranny was enshrined in the Declaration of Independence as
45
the primary justification for the States’ “separation” from Britain. In
the view of the founding generation, the American Revolution was a
46
“war in defense of liberty,” fought “to secure ourselves from
47
despotism.” The revolutionary experience fostered a “tendency to
48
counter-pose ‘government’ and ‘liberty’” and shaped the earliest

103 Mich. L. Rev. 2073, 2108 (2005) (suggesting that when we design regulation, we make assumptions
about the way targets will respond).
43. Baldwin & Black, supra note 43, at 15.
44. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 2.
45. The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (“The history of the present King of
Great Britain is a history of repeated injuries and usurpations, all having in direct object the
establishment of an absolute Tyranny over these States.”).
46. Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776–1787, at 469 (1969)
(quoting Richard Henry Lee writing in opposition to the ratification of the Constitution).
47. Alexander Hamilton, Speech to the New York Ratifying Convention (June 24, 1788).
48. Kramnick, supra note 3, at 19.
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governmental institutions established in the States and the young nation.
State constitutions drafted after 1776 reflected an abject “fear of rulers
49
and of magisterial authority” that was manifest in the dominance of
state legislatures and an outsize enthusiasm for direct democracy.
Despotic anxieties were also evident in the loose post-Revolutionary
structure of the Union under the Articles of Confederation, which
provided no central executive or judicial authority and gave no
meaningful power to the Continental Congress, the only central
governmental institution created by the Articles. This lack of
administrative structure was justified based on the revolutionary
50
experience of struggle “against authority and power, against kings.”
Tyrannophobia persisted as the revolutionaries became nation
builders and sought to strengthen and create national governance
institutions under a new Constitution. Tyrannophobic rhetoric suffused
the debates surrounding the drafting of the Constitution and its
ratification, directed primarily against the document’s proponents, but
ultimately appropriated by them as well. Anti-Federalists, who opposed
a stronger central government, charged that the Constitution would
create a “President-General, or, more properly, our new King,” with
“powers exceeding those of the most despotic monarch we know of in
51
modern times.” They condemned the proposed Senate as a “tyrannical
52
aristocracy.” At the constitutional convention, Anti-Federalists “tended
to see in every limited act of government a larger plan aiming to subvert
53
popular liberty,” and in the ratification debates, they repeatedly likened
the Federalists’ ambitions to those of Caesar, Cromwell, and other
54
prominent historical despots.
The Federalists countered with their own charges of tyranny,
invoking the specter of a despotic majority imposing its will on the
minority through legislative absolutism and mob rule. The Constitution’s
supporters acknowledged that, historically, threats to liberty “came
primarily from monarchs and the executive branch. In America,
however, James Madison wrote, the chief threat to liberty came from the
55
‘legislative power’ and ‘legislative usurpation.’”
Madison elaborated in the Federalist Papers: “The accumulation of
all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands,
whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed,
49. Id. at 21.
50. Id. at 19.
51. Id. at 34.
52. Id. at 64.
53. Posner & Vermuele, supra note 2, at 7 (quoting Max M. Edling, A Revolution in Favor of
Government: Origins of the U.S. Constitution and the Making of the American State 67 (2003));
see also The Antifederalist Papers No. 3, No. 25, No. 70 (Morton Borden ed., 1965).
54. The Antifederalist Papers No. 66; see also Kramnick, supra note 3, at 76.
55. Kramnick, supra note 3, at 49.
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or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”
Thomas Jefferson similarly remarked that “[a]n elective despotism was
57
not the government we fought for.” In addition, the Federalists
highlighted the rampant private coercion—the “terrifying lawless
mob”—that would reign in the absence of strong executive authority.
“[A]narchy leads to tyranny, and better have one tyrant than so many at
58
once.” It was in this way that the Federalists marshaled the fear of
tyranny to justify the expansion of federal executive and judicial
authority.
B. New Deal
“The Founding generation bequeathed to its descendants a ‘chronic
59
antagonism to the state’” that would resurface again and again to shape
debates about the appropriate role and scope of American government.
Fears that the central government established by the Constitution would
turn tyrannical were muted initially because in the decades after
ratification, that government largely avoided what de Tocqueville called
60
“centralized administration.” The federal government “established the
general principles of government,” but it rarely “descended to the details
61
of their application.” It “regulated the great interests of the country,”
62
but did not “descend to the circle of individual interests.” Instead,
administration in the young republic was left largely to local authorities.
De Tocqueville argued that this distinction between centralized
governance and centralized administration was what preserved citizens’
freedoms in the American democracy and protected them from “the
63
puerilities of administrative tyranny.”
The New Deal marked the federal government’s most significant
peacetime expansion into the realm of centralized administration. While
debates about New Deal programs and policies implicated a broad range

56. The Federalist Papers No. XLVII, at 303 (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987).
57. Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia 120 (William Peden ed., Univ. of N.C.
Press 1954) (1787).
58. Debates in the Convention of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, on the Adoption of the
Federal Constitution 103 (Jan. 9, 1788) (statement of Mr. Smith).
59. Aaron L. Friedberg, In the Shadow of the Garrison State 12 (2000).
60. Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 346 (Henry Reeve trans., 1862). But see
Jerry L. Mashaw, Federal Administration and Administrative Law in the Gilded Age, 119 Yale L.J.
1362, 1366 (2010) (arguing that administration played a more central role in pre-Progressive era
governance than conventional accounts typically recognize).
61. de Tocqueville, supra note 60, at 346.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 347. I have omitted from this Part an analysis of discourse about government tyranny
during Confederate secession, the Civil War, and Reconstruction. While this is no doubt a crucial part
of the history and genealogy of anti-coercion discourse in U.S. politics past and present, it falls outside
the immediate domain of my analysis, which deals specifically with the expansion of the federal
government’s administrative capacity.
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of economic, political, philosophical, and moral concerns, state tyranny
was prominent among them. “Administrative reform touched a sensitive
societal nerve and became for many a righteous fight to defend
democracy from dictatorship. Rather than argue arcane issues of
administrative efficiency, constitutional balances, or New Deal politics,
both sides in the administrative reform debate expressed real fears of
64
dictatorship and communism.”
As Congress took up early New Deal legislation, Congressman,
prominent lawyer, and former Solicitor General James Beck warned
65
ominously, “We are about to transform a democracy into a dictatorship.”
Ex-President Herbert Hoover called the New Deal “the most stupendous
invasion of the whole spirit of Liberty that the nation has witnessed since
66
the days of Colonial America.” Initiatives like the National Industrial
Recovery Act, the Agricultural Adjustment Act, and the Tennessee
Valley Authority raised the specter of economic “planning” and fueled
the “charges of dictatorship, of conflicting claims of fascism and socialism
67
leveled at the New Deal.” According to conservative opponents of the
New Deal, the National Industrial Recovery Act was an attempt to
68
“sovietize America;” the Agricultural Adjustment Act would “place[] in
69
the hands of a dictator supreme control of the wealth of America;” and
the Tennessee Valley Authority was “another step on the road to
70
Moscow.” Using similar rhetoric, President Roosevelt’s critics on the
left “damned the NRA [National Recovery Administration] as a ‘fascist
71
slave program’” and charged that it was the same “as Hitler’s program.”
The tyrannophobic rhetoric grew increasingly pervasive and shrill as
anti-New Dealers mobilized and campaigned against the programs
Roosevelt had enacted. The American Liberty League was founded in
1934 by an alliance of Republicans, dissident Democrats, and industrialist
funders like du Pont and General Motors, to develop and disseminate
72
the opposition’s views. The Liberty League published pamphlets on
topics including: “The President Wants More Power,” “Will it Be Ave

64. Shepherd, supra note 4, at 1593.
65. George Wolfskill & John A. Hudson, All but the People: Franklin D. Roosevelt and
His Critics, 1933–39, at 213 (1969).
66. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Age of Roosevelt: The Coming of the New Deal 473
(1958).
67. George Wolfskill, New Deal Critics: Did They Miss the Point?, in Essays on the New Deal
49, 62 (Harold M. Hollingsworth & William F. Holmes eds., 1969).
68. Wolfskill & Hudson, supra note 65, at 213.
69. Id. at 209 (quoting Rep. Ray P. Chase).
70. Id. at 210.
71. David M. Kennedy, Freedom from Fear: The American People in Depression and War,
1929–1945, at 222 (1999).
72. George Wolfskill, The Revolt of the Conservatives: A History of the American Liberty
League, 1934–1940, at 108 (1962).
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73

Caesar?” and “The Way Dictatorships Start.” In the 1934 midterm
election campaigns, “New Deal socialism, communism, and dictatorship
74
were all some Republicans could find to talk about.” One Senate
candidate campaigned for reelection against the “‘arrogant dictatorship
and ruthless destruction of our constitutional rights’ by New Deal
‘bureaucratic busybodies’ and their ‘mad schemes of collectivism and
regimentation’ in a ‘headlong rush of events carrying us on the road to
75
Moscow.’” The Republican party’s national chairman castigated the
New Deal as “government from above,” based “on the proposition that
the people cannot manage their own affairs and that a government
76
bureaucracy must manage for them.” Although the Republicans lost
77
seats with this strategy, partisans of Roosevelt’s opponents in the 1936
presidential election continued to “rage[] about the dictatorship in
78
Washington” and Roosevelt’s “damnable tyranny.” Major newspapers
covering the presidential election weighed in with their own barrage of
tyrannophobic rhetoric. “With the single-mindedness of a trip hammer
many daily newspapers—notably those of Hearst and McCormick—
proclaimed the ‘crisis’ of the imminent Communist revolution in the U.S.
79
and portrayed Roosevelt and his Brain Trust as Reds.”
After Roosevelt’s reelection in 1936, coercive-state rhetoric
continued to drive debates about New Deal policy, the reform of New
Deal policy, and Roosevelt himself. Roosevelt unwittingly fanned the
flames of tyrannophobia with his attempt to expand the membership of
the Supreme Court and fill the new vacancies with justices who would be
more sympathetic to New Deal legislation. Business groups that had long
been opposed to Roosevelt and his New Deal policies used the “courtpacking plan” to plant seeds of doubt about Roosevelt’s motives in the
minds of the broader public. “Provoked by anti-New Deal business
groups . . . some voters began to fear that the president sought the same
absolute authority as the dictators who had recently achieved power in
80
Europe.”
Arcane debates about administrative reform also took a
tyrannophobic turn in the late New Deal period. The usually staid
American Bar Association Special Committee on Administrative Law,
chaired by Roscoe Pound, issued a report in 1938 condemning
“administrative absolutism” and accusing administrators of autocracy in
73. Id.
74. Wolfskill & Hudson, supra note 65, at 217.
75. Id.
76. Wolfskill, supra note 72, at 12.
77. Id. at 13 (noting that Democrats picked up nine seats in the Senate and thirteen seats in the
House, adding to their already overwhelming majorities in Congress).
78. Wolfskill & Hudson, supra note 65, at 107.
79. Id. at 181.
80. Shepherd, supra note 4, at 1581.
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81

their pursuit of efficiency. Proponents of expanded judicial review of
administrative actions claimed that reform was needed to reign in
“dictatorial, vicious and undemocratic” agencies that had run amok in
their “centralization of authority, . . . greed for power, . . . [and] disregard
82
for individual and minority rights.” Administrative reform was sold as a
bulwark against “this wave that is going all over the country, of just
83
taking hold of everybody and telling them what street they get off at.”
Tyrannophobic rhetoric similarly dominated congressional debates about
the Walter-Logan bill, legislation designed to curtail agency discretion by
requiring agencies to observe certain due process procedures and
providing for expanded judicial review of agency action. The House
report contended that the bill was necessary to control agencies that
84
were exercising “autocratic powers.” Floor debate raised fears that the
85
U.S. government had become “a government of men and not of laws.”
C. Postwar Period
If the New Deal’s expansion of administrative governance raised the
specter of state tyranny, then World War II, and the Cold War that
followed, “pushed a fear of totalitarianism (and hence a generalized
wariness about excessive state power) to the center of American political
86
thought.” The clash between free society and totalitarian rule became
87
the defining struggle of the postwar period. The U.S. encounter with
totalitarianism served to confirm the worst fears of conservatives who
had opposed the New Deal, but perhaps more significantly, it planted
seeds of doubt about the role of the state among liberal New Deal
supporters. Statist liberals who had once looked to Europe as the model
of modern and efficient administrative government were shocked and
appalled by the ends to which many of these nations had deployed state
power. Even among the traditional supporters of administrative
governance, “[t]he dreams of an extensive regulatory state were coming
88
to seem unrealistic, perhaps even dangerous.” There was a sense, during
81. Roscoe Pound, Report of the Special Committee on Administrative Law, 63 Ann. Rep. A.B.A.
331, 342–43 (1938).
82. Daniel R. Ernst, The Politics of Administrative Law: New York’s Anti-Bureaucracy Clause
and the O’Brian-Wagner Campaign of 1938, 27 Law & Hist. Rev. 331, 341 (2009).
83. Id. at 347.
84. H.R. Rep. No. 76-1149, at 7 (1939).
85. Schlesinger, supra note 66, at 476.
86. Brinkley, supra note 5, at 86.
87. David Ciepley, Liberalism in the Shadow of Totalitarianism 19 (2006). See generally
Arthur M. Schlesinger, The Vital Center: The Politics of Freedom (1949).
88. Brinkley, supra note 5, at 54; see also Desmond King & Marc Stears, The Missing State in
Postwar American Political Thought, in The Unsustainable American State 116, 123 (Lawrence
Jacobs & Desmond King eds., 2009) (“The immediate postwar and early Cold War United States was
indeed characterized by widespread anxieties about totalitarianism, even on the Far Left of American
politics. A whole host of pre-war radicals thus turned their back on their more ambitious state-
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this period, that “American democracy should strive first and foremost
89
to avoid becoming like” the European dictatorships.
The fear of tyranny was also a defining feature of the Cold War. The
Cold War was framed as an epic conflict between democracy and
dictatorship, with the U.S. cast as the defender of liberty against
90
totalitarian aggression both abroad and at home. In a speech to
Congress, President Truman made international defense against tyranny
a cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy. He argued that the U.S. must
commit itself to helping “free peoples to maintain their free institutions
and their national integrity against aggressive movements that seek to
91
impose upon them totalitarian regimes” in order to foster “conditions in
which we and other nations will be able to work out a way of life free
92
from coercion.” This formulation of U.S. interests and responsibilities
“forged a powerful link between anticommunism abroad and
anticommunism at home. If communism was indeed such an insidious,
all-encompassing menace, it could crop up in one’s own neighborhood
93
just as easily as in some foreign land!” The anxiety about this link lead
to a postwar domestic policy focused on avoiding conquest by Soviet
94
tyrants or subversion by their agents within U.S. borders. Americans
broadly supported policies that many would have found unthinkable
prior to the Cold War, including the development and stockpiling of
atomic weapons as essential in a world “threatened by a savage
95
dictatorship.” The public was also generally supportive of public and
private efforts to expose subversive elements and purge them from
government employment and other positions of influence in order to
96
exorcise the “specter [of Communism] haunting America.”

centered plans at this time . . . .”).
89. Benjamin L. Alpers, Dictators, Democracy, and American Public Culture: Envisioning
the Totalitarian Enemy, 1920s–1950s, at 302 (2003).
90. Id. at 254; John Fousek, To Lead the Free World: American Nationalism and the
Cultural Roots of the Cold War 42, 130 (2000).
91. Harry S. Truman, President of the U.S., Special Message to the Congress on Greece and
Turkey: The Truman Doctrine (Mar. 12, 1947), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/
index.php?pid=12846.
92. Id.
93. Paul Boyer, By the Bomb’s Early Light: American Thought and Culture at the Dawn
of the Atomic Age 103 (1994).
94. Alpers, supra note 89, at 277.
95. Boyer, supra note 93, at 349.
96. Stephen J. Whitfield, The Culture of the Cold War 1 (2d ed. 1991); see also Richard H.
Pells, The Liberal Mind in a Conservative Age: American Intellectuals in the 1940s and 1950s,
at 264 (1985). See generally Richard M. Fried, Nightmare in Red: The McCarthy Era in
Perspective (1990).
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D. Postwar Economic Critiques of Regulation
It was this postwar atmosphere that incubated the economic
critiques of regulation that would form the intellectual basis for late
twentieth-century regulatory reform. Ironically, as the state receded from
97
other social scientific disciplines during this time period, it took center
stage in economic theory. It did so in four different guises: the costly
state, the captured state, the cognitively impaired state, and the coercive
state. Though there is conceptual overlap between and among these
98
categories, and some sophisticated critiques weave the four together,
each represents a distinct way of thinking about the problem of
regulation and, more broadly, the problem of state regulatory power.
1. The Costly State
The paradigmatic vision of the “costly state” is developed in Coase’s
seminal article The Problem of Social Cost. There, he articulates the
deceptively simple insight that “the governmental administrative
machine is not itself costless. It can, in fact, on occasion be extremely
99
costly.” Coase meant this as a corrective both to government
policymakers, who tended to ignore the costs of their regulatory actions,
and to economists, who tended to ignore how the actions of policymakers
100
might affect their understandings of the economy. He made a plea for
both to better understand and address the costs of government
101
Specifically, he argued that legal institutions should
regulation.
consider the economic implications of the rules they promulgate, and
that economists should consider the impact of legal rules and institutions
102
Legal decisionmakers, for instance, “should
on their models.
understand the economic consequences of their decisions and should,
insofar as this is possible without creating too much uncertainty about
the legal position itself, take these consequences into account when
103
making their decisions.”
In this conception, the state is a problem when the costs of
government regulation diminish rather than enhance social welfare.
Specifically, Coase challenged the prevailing assumption that government
104
intervention is always warranted to correct for externalities. Instead, he
argued for a better understanding of the economic consequences of legal

97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

King & Stears, supra note 88, at 118.
See generally Stigler, supra note 9.
Coase, supra note 7, at 18.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 19.
Id. at 9–10.
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rules and the circumstances under which they were warranted. In
Coase’s model, state intervention was unnecessary to correct for
externalities where parties could bargain with one another to reach
106
However, Coase demonstrated that state
efficient outcomes.
intervention could be justified and might, in fact, be necessary if
information barriers, transactions costs, or wealth effects impeded
107
private bargaining. In his view, there was no inherent reason why “on
occasion, such governmental administrative regulation should not lead to
108
an improvement in economic efficiency.” After all, “government has
powers which might enable it to get some things done at a lower cost
109
than could a private organisation.” The key was to analyze the tradeoffs inherent in government decisions about regulation:
[T]he problem is one of choosing the appropriate social arrangement
for dealing with the harmful effects. All solutions have costs and there
is no reason to suppose that government regulation is called for simply
because the problem is not well handled by the market or the firm.
Satisfactory views on policy can only come from a patient study of how,
in practice, the market, firms and governments handle the problem of
110
harmful effects.

Thus, the cost-based critique of regulation did not repudiate
government outright as a means of achieving social goals. Instead, it
reconceptualized the state as one of many problem-solving institutions,
whose merits should be adjudicated based on “the costs involved in
operating the various social arrangements (whether it be the working of
a market or of a government department), as well as the costs involved in
111
moving to a new system.”
Conventional accounts of regulatory reform are an outgrowth of
Coasian cost-based critiques. From this perspective, regulatory reform is
about cutting costs, imposing them in proportion to benefits, and
attending to insights about the incentive structures of regulated entities
toward the end of regulating them more efficiently and effectively. While
this framework posits efficiency as a constraint on state power, it also
envisions a clear role for the state, perhaps even an empowered state that
is more effective in its efforts to regulate its citizens. Although influential,
this was not the only vision of the state found in postwar economic theory.
Like their intellectual contemporaries, postwar economists had their own
dark visions of state power.

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id. at 10.
Id. at 3–5.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 18 (emphasis added).
Id. at 17.
Id. at 18.
Id. at 44.
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2. The Captured State
The “captured state” is the conception of the state that emerges
from public-choice theory. Public-choice theory applies neoclassical
112
economic principles to the policymaking process. From this perspective,
the regulatory state is a forum in which regulated entities compete for
public goods, “a fulcrum upon which contending interests seek to
113
exercise leverage in their pursuit of wealth.” The rational pursuit of
these interests, coupled with collective action problems faced by diffuse
publics, produces a system in which agencies tend to promote the private
interests of small, highly organized groups (in particular, regulated
114
industries) at the expense of the broader public interest. Regulators
are, in this sense, “captured” by the industries they are charged with
115
regulating. In his Economic Theory of Regulation, for instance, George
Stigler demonstrated that major transportation regulations benefitted
incumbent firms in the trucking industry at the expense of new entrants
and used these findings to argue more broadly that “regulation is
acquired by the industry and is designed and operated primarily for its
116
benefit.” James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock argued that industry
prefers (and can secure) command-and-control-type regulatory schemes
over other, more efficient regulatory tools that would provide a greater
public benefit, because direct regulation has the effect of imposing
117
quotas that raise the prices and profits of regulated firms. Similarly,
Roger Noll attributed the Food and Drug Administration’s (“FDA”)
laxity in drug regulation to the desire of FDA staffers for employment
118
with pharmaceutical companies.
In the captured state, regulation is driven by, and serves the
interests of, private groups and individuals rather than the public at
large. The theory explicitly rejects the possibility that a regulator might
seek “not to maximize his own utility, but to find the ‘public interest’ or
119
‘common good.’” In this view, there is no collective action (or
collective good) apart from the aggregation of private, individual, utilitymaximizing choices. This drive to “exclude the notion of a public good”

112. Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell, Introduction: A Brief Trajectory of Public
Choice and Public Law, in Research Handbook on Public Choice and Public Law 1, 1 (Daniel A.
Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell eds., 2010).
113. Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & Econ. 211, 212 (1976).
114. See generally James M. Buchanan & Gordon Tullock, Polluters’ Profits and Political
Response: Direct Controls Versus Taxes, 65 Am. Econ. Rev. 139 (1975).
115. See, e.g., Roger G. Noll, Reforming Regulation: An Evaluation of the Ash Council
Proposals (1971); Buchanan & Tullock, supra note 114.
116. Stigler, supra note 9, at 114.
117. Buchanan & Tullock, supra note 114.
118. Noll, supra note 115.
119. James M. Buchanan & Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations
of Constitutional Democracy 20 (1962).
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120

and to “treat all social actors as inherently self-seeking” characterized
much postwar work in the social sciences. Some have suggested that it
was a product of anti-totalitarian anxieties and associated researchfunding priorities, which funneled research support to those projects that
sought to construct a model of democratic politics distinct from the
121
collectivist visions of European dictators.
Despite this pedigree, its prescriptions for the role of the state were
ambiguous. Capture arguments were taken up across the political
spectrum to argue for radically incompatible visions of the state. At one
pole, Ralph Nader and his consumer-protection movement mobilized the
capture critique to argue that Congress should aggrandize agencies and
insulate them from the corrosive effects of private power with layers of
122
new statutory prescriptions and procedures. At the other, libertarians
like F.A. Hayek deployed them to support their position that the
123
regulatory state should be significantly circumscribed.
3. The Cognitively Impaired State
The “cognitively impaired state” is most closely associated with
Hayek and the Austrian school of economics. Hayek stressed the
extreme knowledge constraints under which human beings and human
institutions operate. From this perspective, the limitations of the state lie
in the cognitive limitations of individuals, specifically “the necessary and
irremediable ignorance on everyone’s part of most of the particular facts
which determine the actions of all the several members of human
124
society.” According to Hayek, human knowledge is both fragmented
and tacit. Each individual “can have only a small fraction of the
knowledge possessed by all, and . . . each is therefore ignorant of most of
125
the facts on which the working of society rests.” Moreover, individuals
are incapable of accurately and explicitly articulating the limited
knowledge they have about the rules and conventions that govern the
126
working of society. According to Hayek, these limitations are an
inherent function of human cognition and, thus, they cannot be
127
overcome simply by getting more knowledge.

120. Ciepley, supra note 87, at 180.
121. Id. See generally S.M. Amadae, Rationalizing Capitalist Democracy: The Cold War
Origins of Rational Choice Liberalism (2003).
122. Eisner, supra note 10, at 179–80.
123. See infra notes 125–34.
124. 1 F.A. Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty: A New Statement of the Liberal Principles
of Justice and Political Economy, Rules and Order 12 (1973).
125. Id. at 14.
126. Amy J. Cohen, Governance Legalism: Hayek and Sabel on Reason and Rules, Organization
and Law, 2010 Wis. L. Rev. 357, 363.
127. Andrew Gamble, Hayek on Knowledge, Economics, and Society, in The Cambridge
Companion to Hayek 11, 117 (Edward Feser ed., 2006).
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The limited cognitive ability of individuals, in turn, renders
“attempts to influence intelligently the processes of society very much
more difficult, and . . . places severe limits on what we can say or do
128
about them.” If knowledge is “dispersed and much of it tacit, there is
no way a central authority, such as a legislature or a court, can obtain and
integrate the knowledge necessary for sensible decisions on issues of law
129
or policy.” Even well-intentioned state efforts to regulate are doomed
to fail under such inhospitable circumstances.
By contrast, Hayek argued that markets provide a much more
effective means of social organization than does government regulation
because markets function without any intentionality or design from
130
imperfect human actors. Markets move social action “in the right
131
direction” through the mechanism of price rather than conscious
planning. If a raw material is scarce, it will command a high price, forcing
people to use it more sparingly. If more grain is needed to expand the
production of ethanol, it will be planted based on the promise of profits.
“At no time does a central planner need to understand why resources are
moving as they are or attempt to anticipate how their movements ought
132
to change next week.” This, according to Hayek, is the “marvel” of the
133
market and its source of superiority over state-based regulation.
4. The Coercive State
Some postwar economists pushed the logics of capture and cognitive
impairment further, to argue that because regulators wield state power to
favor one set of private interests over others, and because they are
incapable of doing otherwise, they should be viewed with the kind of
suspicion and reproach typically reserved for dictators. In this view,
government regulation of private individuals is nothing more than bald
coercion that threatens the freedom of all citizens.
The paradigmatic articulation of this critique is Hayek’s The Road
to Serfdom. Hayek argued that, with the expansion of welfare policies
and economic regulation, western democracies had “progressively
abandoned that freedom in economic affairs without which personal and
134
political freedom has never existed in the past.” Like the public-choice
theorists, Hayek saw no empirical or theoretical basis for the concept of

128. Hayek, supra note 124, at 12.
129. Richard A. Posner, Hayek, Law and Cognition, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & Liberty 147, 159 (2005).
130. See generally Chen & Hanson, supra note 8.
131. Friedrich A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society 15 (1945).
132. Chen & Hanson, supra note 8, at 24.
133. Id. This perspective on the state contrasts sharply with Coasian accounts that are more
optimistic about the government’s ability to mimic market allocations of resources by correcting
market failures. Posner, supra note 129, at 161.
134. Friedrich A. Hayek, The Road to Serfdom 13 (1944).
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a “public” or “common” interest separate from the interests of
individuals. He argued instead that the concept of a broader “public
good” was pretextual, used to justify “legislation to authorize coercion,
not merely to prevent unjust action but to achieve particular results for
135
specific persons or groups.” Because of its coercive potential, Hayek
saw great danger in legislative and administrative power: “Legislation,
the deliberate making of law, has justly been described as among all
inventions of man the one fraught with the gravest consequences, more
136
far-reaching in its effects even than fire and gun-powder.”
These arguments were animated by a “slippery slope” logic that saw
isolated exercises of state power leading ultimately and inexorably to
fascism. No regulatory restrictions could be justified, because “[e]ach
degree of restraint imposed by the State multiplies the danger of taking a
137
As one late twentieth-century economist
next restrictive step.”
articulated: “Freedom is not divisible. You cannot deny basic rights to
one segment of the society, without denying them to every segment, right
138
down to the individual.” According to this logic, regulation “is not a
system which can be coolly experimented with and then dropped, if it
fails, with no greater loss than a return to the status quo. There is no easy
139
way back.”
Hayek’s libertarian critique of regulation deeply influenced Chicago
School economic thinking about regulation. Henry Simons, the first
economist at the University of Chicago Law School, was “genuinely
spooked at what he saw as threats not just to the free market, but the
140
free society.” He thought that “totalitarian dictatorship could be
avoided only by a drastic revival, rebuilding, and unyielding preservation
of the ‘libertarian’ society and economy as conceived in the eighteenth
141
Stigler similarly echoed Hayek’s concerns about the
century.”
connection between economic regulation and fascism:
If the expansion of control of economic life which has been under way
in Britain, the United States, and other democratic western countries
should continue long enough and far enough, the totalitarian system of
Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy will eventually be reached . . . .
[T]otalitarian systems are an extreme form of, not a different type
142
from, the democratic “welfare” states . . . .

135. Id. at 2.
136. Id. at 72.
137. John Jewkes, Ordeal by Planning 195 (1948).
138. Harry J. Bolwell, A New Threat to Freedom: The Challenge of the 1980s, in The Limits of
Government Regulation 25, 30 (James F. Gatti ed., 1981).
139. Jewkes, supra note 137, at 9 (emphasis omitted).
140. Steven M. Teles, The Rise of the Conservative Legal Movement: The Battle for
Control of the Law 91 (2008).
141. O.H. Taylor, The Economics of a “Free” Society: Four Essays, 62 Q.J. Econ. 641, 651 (1948).
142. Stigler, supra note 9, at 17.
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He argued that the U.S. regulatory state threatened not only the markets
in which it interfered directly, but the panoply of individual liberties that
the free market was meant to safeguard. “Let us begin with the most
fundamental issue posed by the increasing direction of economic life by
the state: the preservation of the individual’s liberty—liberty of speech,
143
of occupation, of choice of home, of education.” Milton Friedman
adapted these arguments to reflect Cold War anxieties in Capitalism and
Freedom, where he equated the threat of U.S. government regulation
with Soviet threats of annihilation.
The one threat is obvious and clear. It is the external threat coming
from the evil men in the Kremlin who promise to bury us. The other
threat is far more subtle. It is the internal threat coming from men of
144
good intentions and good will who wish to reform us.

These four conceptions of the state embody very different logics of
government regulation. The next two Parts will examine how they have
shaped the legal debate about regulatory reform.

III. The Logic of Command and Control
The logics of a particular institution are often revealed by the way
145
people talk about it—specifically, by the way they critique or justify it.
For instance, the pervasive criticism of politicians who pursue personal
ends while in office suggests the widely shared ideal that public office
holders should surrender their individual interests to the greater public
good. Such discourse reveals what one might call a “civic” or “public
146
interest” logic governing public office holding in a democracy. To
ascertain the logic of late twentieth-century regulatory reform, I examine
the criticisms that were made of regulation, the reforms that were
considered, and the justifications that were proffered for reform. My
analysis focuses on academic discourse about regulation, specifically the
debate about command-and-control regulation and its reform that
developed in law review scholarship between 1980 and 2005.
Though my focus on legal-academic discourse necessarily limits the
kinds of empirical claims I can make, the insights generated by this
analysis have broader practical relevance. Academic discourse and
regulatory practice have long been inextricably intertwined. Regulatory
regimes consist not only of the institutions that administer regulatory
policy and the policies they implement, but the ideas justifying their
147
control over private activity. This has been nowhere more evident than
in the U.S. administrative state, where significant intellectual capital has
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Id. at 5.
Milton Friedman, Capitalism & Freedom 201 (1962).
See generally Boltanski & Thévenot, supra note 40.
Id. at 185–93.
Harris & Milkis, supra note 10, at 25–31.

Short_63-HLJ-633 (Do Not Delete)

March 2012]

3/26/2012 5:18 PM

THE PARANOID STYLE IN REGULATORY REFORM

657

been invested in legitimizing the constitutionally suspect “headless fourth
148
branch” of government. Likewise, effectuating a change in regulatory
regimes depends on their opponents’ ability to articulate a “criticism of
149
the status quo on the level of ideas and institutions.” Scholars of late
twentieth-century regulatory reform have recognized that this movement
150
“was energized for many years by academics” who provided “scholarly
151
support and theoretical justification” for its initiatives. These academic
critiques and justifications generated, or at least articulated, a logic that
shaped thinking about what kind of regulation was rational and
acceptable. In this way, they were integral to the practice of regulatory
reform.
Moreover, regulatory scholarship in the legal field provides a
particularly fruitful context for this study. First, lawyers are key players
in developing and implementing law and policy, especially in the
regulatory field, and law review scholarship broadly represents the views
of those who train lawyers, as well as of the many practitioners and
152
students of law who publish in them. Second, unlike many academic
journals, law reviews are broadly interdisciplinary. Legal scholars borrow
ideas from a broad range of other academic disciplines and translate
them for a legal audience. In this way, law reviews serve as a sort of
intellectual bazaar, offering a taste not only of contemporary legal
thought, but of intellectual currents more broadly. Finally, law
professors, who produce the bulk of law review scholarship, occupy a
unique position in the legal profession that has no parallel in other fields.
Since the advent of modern legal education in the early twentieth
century, legal scholars were seen not only as teachers and trainers, but as
the great rationalizers of an increasingly complex and incoherent legal
system. While legal authority ultimately rested with the courts, the bar
looked to legal scholars to “work[] into comprehensive analytical
153
systems” the often confusing and conflicting opinions of the judiciary.

148. See, e.g., James Landis, The Administrative Process 4 (1938); Richard B. Stewart, The
Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 1667, 1671 (1975).
149. Harris & Milkis, supra note 10, at 49.
150. Cudahy, supra note 10, at 556.
151. Steven P. Croley, Regulation and Public Interests: The Possibility of Good Regulatory
Government 2 (2008).
152. See generally Frances Kahn Zemans & Victor G. Rosenblum, The Making of a Public
Profession (1981) (discussing judges interpreting and enforcing the laws and regulations that comprise
the regulatory system); Jonathan R. Macey, Lawyers in Agencies: Economics, Social Psychology, and
Process, 61 Law & Contemp. Prob. 109 (1998) (discussing legal practitioners litigating cases that define
their clients’ legal responsibilities); Robert L. Nelson et al., Lawyers and the Structure of Influence in
Washington, 22 Law & Soc’y Rev. 237 (1988) (explaining that lawyers occupy diverse roles in the
regulatory and policymaking process, including staffers drafting legislation); John C. Yoo, Lawyers in
Congress, 61 Law & Contemp. Prob. 1 (1998) (discussing agency attorneys drafting and enforcing
regulations).
153. William C. Chase, The American Law School and the Rise of Administrative
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In other words, the role of law professors is to articulate the logics of the
154
legal field.

Figure A: Number of Articles per Year Discussing
Command-and-Control Regulation

“Command and control” is the central logic organizing an important
strand of late twentieth-century legal discourse about regulatory reform.
The term is deployed routinely in articles that criticize regulation, but it
also is adopted by regulation’s proponents as they seek to respond to
these critiques and by others who come to use it as shorthand for statebased regulation. As reflected in Figure A, above, over the last three
decades “command and control” has become, quite simply, the way legal
scholars talk about state-based regulation. While only 82 articles used it
155
156
to describe regulation in the 1980s, use skyrockets in the 1990s to 634

Government 19 (1982).
154. See generally Pierre Bourdieu, The Force of Law: Toward a Sociology of the Juridical Field,
38 Hastings L.J. 805 (1987).
155. My choice to begin my analysis in 1980 is largely an artifact of the LexisNexis database, which,
when this research was conducted, archived law review articles only as far back as 1980. To ensure that
my analysis did not miss any important literature before this date, I ran the same search in the more
extensive HeinOnline database, which contains complete archives of most law reviews. This search
turned up only seventeen articles on command-and-control regulation prior to 1980. Sixteen of these
were published between 1977 and 1979. One article, on regulation in Norway, appeared in 1956. I have
not included any of the pre-1980 articles in my analysis.
156. Note that the first significant uptick in discussion of command-and-control regulation occurs
in 1991, the same year that significant amendments to the Clean Air Act were passed. The next
significant uptick occurs in 1994, corresponding with the Republican Contract with America.
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articles and continues a sharp upward trend through 2005, with 673
157
articles in the first five years of this century.
It is important to note that the articles deploying “command and
control” terminology are penned by legal scholars coming from a range
of different normative perspectives on regulation, and not predominantly
by committed libertarians. The most influential scholars in the debate
captured by my sample, as measured by their citation counts, are:
Richard Stewart, Cass Sunstein, Bruce Ackerman, Stephen Breyer, Ian
Ayers, John Braithwaite, Jody Freeman, and Charles Sabel. More than
half of the articles in my sample express a neutral (47%) or explicitly
positive (5%) view of the regulatory approach they characterize as
“command and control.” This widespread use of the term, even by
proponents of government regulation, suggests that it has become deeply
institutionalized in the legal lexicon and ingrained in legal thinking about
regulation. For this reason, it is important to ascertain what meanings
158
attach to the ubiquitous term.
Although “command and control” has become widely used shorthand in contemporary legal circles, it is rarely defined and its meanings
and functions have become either submerged or taken for granted. The
term purports to describe regulatory practices dating as far back as the
159
160
161
Great Society, the New Deal, or even World War I, but it does not
begin to appear regularly in law review scholarship until the late 1970s. A
1980 article by James Krier and Richard Stewart provides an early
definition of the term: “As the phrase perhaps implies, this regulatory
approach typically proceeds by imposing rigid standards of
conduct . . . backed up by sanctions designed to assure full compliance
162
with such standards . . . .” Other articles that attempt an explicit
definition likewise characterize command and control as a regulatory

157. It bears noting that the number of law reviews has increased significantly over this same time
period. The Index of Legal Periodicals catalogues 360 U.S. legal periodicals in the 1979–1980 edition
and that number rises to 675 in the 2004–2005 edition. However, this near-doubling of the available
avenues for legal scholarship does not account for the documented rise in command-and-control
discourse, which was six times greater in the 1990s than in the 1980s and, if the trend holds, will be
more than ten times greater in the first decade of the 2000s than in the 1980s.
158. My sampling frame omits bodies of legal and other disciplinary literature on regulatory
reform that do not so widely invoke the term “command and control.” These bodies of literature may
frame the problem of regulation differently, and it would be useful for future research to examine this
question.
159. Robert Cooter, Market Affirmative Action, 31 San Diego L. Rev. 133, 164 (1994).
160. Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of the Workplace in an Era of Self-Regulation,
105 Colum. L. Rev. 319, 321 (2005); Donald W. Stever, Experience and Lessons of Twenty-Five Years
of Environmental Law: Where We Have Been and Where We Are Headed, 27 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1105,
1109 n.7 (1994).
161. Stephen M. Griffin, Constitutional Theory Transformed, 108 Yale L.J. 2115, 2131 (1999).
162. James E. Krier & Richard B. Stewart, Using Economic Analysis in Teaching Environmental
Law: The Example of Common Law Rules, 1 UCLA J. Envtl. L. & Pol’y 13, 15 n.3 (1980).
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technique that is both coercive and punitive: “The essence of commandand-control . . . regulation is the exercise of influence by imposing
163
standards backed by . . . sanctions.”
These definitions are unhelpful in defining the problem of commandand-control regulation because they simply affirm that command-andcontrol regulation is a type of law. Legal theory has long incorporated
punishment and coercion into its understandings of law. In John Austin’s
classic formulation, “[l]aws proper or properly so called, are
164
commands” to which obedience is secured by the threat of sanctions.
Donald Black has influentially defined law as “governmental social
165
control” obtained through targeted application of punishments and
rewards. Noah Feldman has more recently characterized “doing law” as
166
Robert Cover famously
“coercing and demanding compliance.”
167
highlighted the “violent domination” that underlies legal authority.
However, the critique of command-and-control regulation does not
purport to be a broader critique of law per se. Consequently, explicit
definitions of command-and-control regulation shed little light on what
makes it so problematic.
The term’s genealogy similarly fails to illuminate what is so
problematic about this style of regulation. The “command and control”
idiom was widely used before legal scholars adopted it, and it continues
168
to be deployed in a number of different fields, where it serves different
functions and takes on different meanings depending on the context. It
tends to be used either structurally or descriptively. Structural uses refer
nominally (and typically neutrally) to the internal architecture of
169
organizations. Descriptive uses typically (although not universally)
pejoratively portray a management style characterized by hierarchy and
170
compulsion.
In military parlance, “command and control” is a noun that
designates (rather than an adjective that describes) organizational
decisionmaking and implementation processes. It is a structural
mechanism for achieving objectives within large and unwieldy
organizations. “Command and Control is about focusing the efforts of a
number of entities (individuals and organizations) and resources,
including information, toward the achievement of some task, objective,

163. Robert Baldwin, Regulation: After “Command and Control,” in The Human Face of Law:
Essays in Honour of Donald Harris 65, 65 (Keith Hawkins ed., 1997).
164. John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined vii (1832).
165. Donald Black, The Behavior of Law 2 (1976) (adopted by Lawrence M. Friedman,
American Law: An Introduction 17 (2d ed. 1998)).
166. Noah Feldman, Cosmopolitan Law?, 116 Yale L.J. 1022, 1062 (2007).
167. Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 Yale L.J. 1601, 1604 (1986).
168. See infra note 173.
169. See infra note 173.
170. See infra note 173.
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171

or goal.” In this context, effective command and control is seen as
absolutely essential to the successful completion of military missions.
While hierarchy and coercion may be used as command-and-control
techniques if appropriate to a particular situation, they are not by any
means integral to the practice or the concept. In fact, flexible and fluid
organizational arrangements are the current vogue in cutting-edge
172
military work on command and control.
A number of academic disciplines have borrowed the military
terminology of “command and control” and applied it in a similar sense
to denote organizational structures or functions. Scholarship in
development and globalization, for instance, discusses the spatial
distribution of command-and-control functions in transnational
173
corporations. It is also used in the management literature to refer to
the organizational structure of the late twentieth-century corporation,
characterized by decentralized departments managed through layers of
174
staff, budgets, and rules.
The term “command and control” is also used descriptively in the
management literature on human resources. Here, it describes a rigid,
hierarchical management style that is mostly maligned. Recent
commentary by management consultants unfavorably contrasts commandand-control approaches, said to stifle creativity and lead to resentment
175
or
and defiance, with preferred approaches like “lead[ing]”
176
“coaching,” designed to help employees and organizations reach their
full potential. One commentator criticizes the command-and-control
style in which managers attempt to “achieve better or faster results by
177
holding a tight rein on those who work for us.” Instead, he advises
managers: “If you want results from people, you need to lead them, not
178
Another consultant warns that
control or manage them.”
“[i]ndividuals’ imagination and interest do not thrive in command-and179
control structures.” Instead, she urges clients to “[i]magine a work
180
environment when everyone is committed to a common goal.” Even in
this literature, however, the command-and-control approach has its
advocates. An article praising railroads for their effective response to
Hurricane Katrina credits their command-and-control management style

171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
(2000).
177.
178.
179.
180.

David S. Alberts & Richard E. Hayes, Understanding Command and Control 32 (2006).
Id. at 61.
See, e.g., Saskia Sassen, The Global City: New York, London, Tokyo (1991).
See Peter F. Drucker, The Coming of the New Organization, 66 Harv. Bus. Rev. 45, 47 (1988)
See generally Bart Bolton, Control or Lead? It’s Your Choice, 22 Info. Sys. Mgmt. 81 (2005).
See generally Lisa Aldisert, From Command and Control to Coaching, 32 Bank Marketing 36
Bolton, supra note 175, at 81.
Id.
Aldisert, supra note 176, at 36.
Id.
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for their ability “to achieve that mission quickly, efficiently and
181
economically.” In this alternative characterization of “command and
control”:
[P]olicies are adopted at the top of the organization and execution
commands are communicated down through the management, with
each succeeding layer applying its expertise until it gets to the point out
182
on the railroad where a worker drives a spike.

From this perspective, “command and control” describes a management
183
system with clear lines of “responsibility and accountability.”
Legal scholars might have taken up any one of these meanings in
the quest for regulatory reform. One can imagine a regulatory reform
debate that embraces “command and control” in the military sense, as
essential to achieving goals and tasks in a large and complex society.
Moreover, one can imagine a regulatory reform debate that advocates
command and control to create clear channels of responsibility. In the
next Part, I explore what “command and control” came to mean in the
legal debate about regulation.

IV. Empirical Study: The Legal Critique and Reform of
Command-and-Control Regulation
A. Taxonomy of the Critiques
In the law review articles that explicitly engage the term, “command
and control” takes on strong negative connotations. It is a problem in
need of reform. The puzzle for my analysis was to figure out precisely
what kind of problem command-and-control regulation was thought to
be. Across the range of articles analyzed, ten arguments against
command-and-control regulation appear commonly enough to warrant
coding them distinctly: bureaucracy, coercive, costly, end-of-pipe,
ineffective, inefficient, information, interest group, legalistic, and
184
uniform. I describe the essence of each critique briefly in Table 1,
below, and provide more detailed coding criteria and examples of articles
coded as making these arguments in the Methodological Appendix to
this Article.

181. Lawrence H. Kaufman, Command and Control, and Accountability, 19 J. Com. 14, 14 (2005).
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. I note here that some of the articles in my sample make arguments in favor of command-andcontrol regulation. The most common arguments are that command-and-control regulation is:
necessary, effective, or morally required. I do not include these arguments in the text because my
analysis sought primarily to identify the critiques of regulation. Moreover, positive arguments
occurred infrequently as compared to the critiques. To give some sense of proportion, a given article
was two-and-a-half times more likely to say that command-and-control regulation was coercive than to
say that it was necessary.
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Table 1: Critiques of Command-and-Control
Regulation (“CCR”)
Code
bureaucracy

Summary of the Critique
CCR is administered by a centralized bureaucracy, remote
from the concerns of local constituencies and staffed by
unaccountable bureaucrats.

coercive

CCR is an instrument of coercive state intrusions into private
affairs.

costly

CCR imposes excessive costs on regulated entities or is more
costly for the government to implement than some other
alternative.

end-of-pipe

CCR addresses problems only after the fact and fails to deal
with root causes.

ineffective

CCR does not work; it does not achieve regulators’
objectives.

inefficient

CCR is, itself, inefficient, or it causes inefficiencies or
distortions in the operations of markets or regulated firms.

information
interest group

CCR requires regulators either to act based on incomplete or
low quality information or to expend considerable resources
gaining sufficient information to regulate effectively.
CCR lends itself to rent seeking and capture by private
interests.

legalistic

CCR creates an increasingly complex legal scheme that
subjugates regulated entities to the expertise of the
bureaucrats who apply it and the lawyers who interpret it.

uniform

CCR applies identical standards to all regulated entities,
failing to take into account particularities and unique
circumstances that might warrant differential treatment.

These arguments are the discursive tools legal scholars use to
elaborate precisely what kind of problem command-and-control
regulation is. As Timothy Malloy recently demonstrated, regulation is
not a problem per se, but rather comes to be defined as problem, in part
185
through the academic discourses of law scholars. It is important to
understand how regulation gets constructed as a problem, because this
construction drives scholars’ (and sometimes regulators’ and
policymakers’) perceptions of regulation’s “defects and limitations, and
186
consequently shapes . . . view[s] of the necessary reforms.” Critique and
reform are typically united by a common logic, or a set of values and
assumptions about “the nature of the practice of government (who can

185. See Malloy, supra note 13, at 268.
186. Id.
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govern; what governing is; what or who is governed).” Although
governance logics do not dictate policy outcomes, they serve as building
blocks for thinking about and generating new policies and practices, and
they circumscribe kinds of problems that can be identified and
188
understood and the kinds of solutions that can be developed. The next
phase of my analysis documents the reforms that were proposed as
alternatives to command-and-control regulation.
B. Taxonomy of the Proposed Reforms
Over 70% of the articles (983) discuss particular reforms, which fall
into four broad categories: (1) deregulation, (2) liability-based
regulation, (3) market-based regulation, and (4) self-regulation. There is
a good deal of conceptual overlap among these categories, and many
articles propose using them in combination with one another.
Nonetheless, they represent distinct, identifiable approaches to solving
the problem of command-and-control regulation, and they each operate
based on a particular logic of regulation.
1. Deregulation
189

I use deregulation here in its narrow sense to mean the repeal of
laws and regulations or the withdrawal of legal authority from
190
administrative agencies. While relatively few reformers advocated pure
deregulation, there was a strand of the regulatory reform movement that
“looked at the problems associated with regulation and concluded that it
should be gotten rid of entirely—that the problems it was trying to solve
were better left to the market or to alternative methods of social
191
control.”
2. Liability-Based Regulation
Liability-based regulation is a reform that relies on the disciplinary
effects of the tort system to regulate private conduct. Instead of directing

187. Colin Gordon, Governmental Rationality: An Introduction, in The Foucault Effect:
Studies in Governmentality 1, 3 (Graham Burchell et al. eds., 1991).
188. See generally Jonathan Simon, Governing Through Crime: How the War on Crime
Transformed American Democracy and Created a Culture of Fear (2007).
189. “Deregulation” sometimes is used much more loosely and expansively to encompass
regulatory reform more generally. One article, for instance, suggests that deregulation entails the
replacement of command-and-control approaches to regulation with “rules that use markets and
market approaches as regulatory tools.” Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Globalization, Democracy, and the Need
for a New Administrative Law, 10 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 125, 127 (2003) (footnote omitted).
However, because I place these “incentive” or “market-based” approaches to regulatory reform in
their own distinct category, I reserve the “deregulation” code for deregulation only in its purest sense.
190. Id. at 126 (“Some forms of deregulation, such as those accomplished by legislation, result in
the outright repeal of regulatory structures an agency-enabling acts . . . .”).
191. Eads & Fix, supra note 16, at 8.
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or prohibiting certain conduct, these approaches hold private parties
legally liable for negative consequences of their conduct. The financial
penalties attaching to liability are meant to compensate those harmed for
their injuries and to deter damaging conduct in the future. Advocates
argue that the incentives and disincentives created by the threat of
liability shape behavior more fairly and effectively than does command192
and-control regulation. So, for instance, one article in my sample
argues that environmental-protection goals could have been realized
more fully through the “removal of regulatory obstacles to public
nuisance actions and greater local initiative, the evolution of common
law doctrines to accommodate the needs of environmental litigation, or
the adoption of measures designed to supplement and enhance
193
traditional common law protections.”
3. Market-Based Regulation
While deregulation seeks to remove the state from markets, marketbased regulation seeks to deploy markets as regulatory tools of the state.
There is a great deal of market talk in the regulatory reform debate, with
194
articles touting the “virtues of the free market,” introducing “free
195
market environmentalists,” and arguing that agencies should “harness[]
196
the power of the market” to achieve their regulatory goals. Like
deregulation, market-based reforms rely on price to coordinate behavior.
However, in market-based regulation, government wields price as a tool
to manipulate the behavior of regulated entities rather than stepping
back to let private transactions set price.
Emissions-trading schemes in which regulators create and oversee a
market in pollution credits that can be freely traded among regulated
firms are paradigmatic of the market-based approach. “Under an
emissions trading system, the government sets pollution standards that
individual factories must meet, allocates appropriate permits, and then
allows factories to trade any excess permits. . . . [This approach]
decentralizes regulatory control, and thus allows the private sector to
197
find cheaper and more effective solutions.” Also encompassed in my
market-based regulation code are regulatory taxes and other price-based

192. Jonathan H. Adler, Fables of the Cuyahoga: Reconstructing a History of Environmental
Protection, 14 Fordham Envtl. L. Rev. 89, 144 (2002).
193. Id.
194. Kahn, supra note 10, at 330.
195. David M. Driesen, What’s Property Got to Do with It?, 30 Ecology L.Q. 1003, 1007–08 (2003)
(reviewing Daniel Cole, Pollution & Property: Comparing Ownership Institutions for
Environmental Protection (2002)).
196. Jesse Ratcliffe, Comment, Reenvisioning the Risk Bubble: Utilizing a System of Intra-Firm
Risk Trading for Environmental Protection, 92 Calif. L. Rev. 1779, 1793 (2004).
197. Brian C. Lewis, Note, Prevention of Computer Crime Amidst International Anarchy, 41 Am.
Crim. L. Rev. 1353, 1370 (2004) (footnotes omitted).
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schemes that attempt to influence the behavior of firms in existing
markets by altering their incentive structure to take account of
externalities. As one article explains, “one of the merits of taxation as
opposed to command-and-control regulation is that it permits firms
flexibility in how the external harm [that regulation seeks to ameliorate]
198
is factored into production.” In addition, to ensure that I captured the
extensive influence of market-based regulation in my sample, I applied
this code broadly to include articles that simply mention the use of
199
“markets” or “incentives” as regulatory tools.
4. Self-Regulation
While self-regulation is sometimes characterized as a particular type
of market-based regulation, it has its own defining characteristics that
justify placing it in a separate category. Consequently, articles that
discuss one of the specific forms of self-regulation I describe in this Part
are categorized here, even if they also discuss “market” based
approaches.
Specifically, self-regulation shifts responsibility for traditionally
governmental functions like standard setting, monitoring, and enforcement
to regulated entities and the broader community of regulatory
beneficiaries. In their classic book Responsive Regulation, Ian Ayres and
John Braithwaite define self-regulation as follows:
[S]elf-regulation envisions that in particular contexts it will be more
efficacious for the regulated firms to take on some or all of the
legislative, executive, and judicial regulatory functions. As selfregulating legislators, firms would devise their own regulatory rules; as
self-regulating executives, firms would monitor themselves for
noncompliance; and as self-regulating judges, firms would punish and
200
correct episodes of noncompliance.

198. Henry E. Smith, Ambiguous Quality Changes from Taxes and Legal Rules, 67 U. Chi. L. Rev.
647, 682–83 (2000).
199. See Mark A. Cohen & Paul H. Rubin, Private Enforcement of Public Policy, 3 Yale J. on
Reg. 167, 187 (1985); E. Donald Elliott, Environmental Law at a Crossroad, 20 N. Ky. L. Rev. 1, 10–12
(1992); Clark C. Havighurst, Vicarious Liability: Relocating Responsibility for the Quality of Medical
Care, 26 Am. J.L. & Med. 7, 7–18 (2000); Richard J. Lazarus, Pursuing “Environmental Justice”: The
Distributional Effects of Environmental Protection, 87 Nw. U. L. Rev. 787, 849 (1993); Robert R.
Nordhaus & Kyle W. Danish, Assessing the Options for Designing a Mandatory U.S. Greenhouse Gas
Reduction Program, 32 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 97, 102–09 (2005); Thomas O. Sargentich, The
Reform of the American Administrative Process: The Contemporary Debate, 1984 Wis. L. Rev. 385,
421; James Briggs, Comment, Ski Resorts and National Forests: Rethinking Forest Service Management
Practices for Recreational Use, 28 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 79, 107 (2000); Kenneth M. Swenson, Note,
A Stitch in Time: The Continental Shelf, Environmental Ethics, and Federalism, 60 S. Cal. L. Rev. 851,
875–78 (1987); Jennifer Yelin-Kefer, Note, Warming up to an International Greenhouse Gas Market:
Lessons from the U.S. Acid Rain Experience, 20 Stan. Envtl. L.J. 221, 225–31 (2001).
200. Ian Ayres & John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation
Debate 103 (1992).
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Instead of looking to economics or markets for regulatory technologies,
self-regulation retains core legal institutions, but relocates them within
private entities.
A number of regulatory programs and practices illustrate the kinds
of techniques that fall into the self-regulation category. For example,
firms operate as “self-regulating legislators” when they set standards for
201
or private-sector
themselves through agency-sponsored programs
202
initiatives. Regulated firms act as “self-regulating executives” when
they are given compliance-monitoring responsibilities under agency
203
programs or when they adopt internal compliance-monitoring practices
independently. Finally, some agency programs place firms in the role of
“self-regulating judges” by inviting them to apply the law to themselves,
determine whether it has been violated, and voluntarily report and
204
remediate legal violations.
In addition to efforts by firms to regulate themselves, self-regulation
encompasses government initiatives that shift governance responsibilities
to the citizen-beneficiaries of regulation. In other words, “[r]egulation is
self-regulation when government shares with regulated entities and
regulatory beneficiaries the power either to set the contents of
205
regulations or to enforce regulations, or both at once.” Examples of
this approach include programs that seek the input of citizen206
stakeholders in developing regulatory standards, programs that enlist

201. For example, the Environmental Protection Agency’s Performance Track requires applicants
and members to demonstrate a commitment to continuous environmental improvement by
implementing policies and systems that go beyond regulatory compliance. See Environmental Prot.
Agency, Partnership Programs May Expand EPA’s Influence 30–31 (2006). The FDA sponsors the
National Shellfish Sanitation Program, a cooperative endeavor coordinating the efforts of state and
federal regulators with industry representatives to ensure the safety and sanitation of mollusks and
other shellfish. In this program, the shellfish industry is responsible for “obtaining shellfish from safe
sources, provid[ing] plants that meet sanitary standards, maintain[ing] sanitary operating conditions as
well as helping regulators develop the standards to which the industry will hold itself at the annual
Interstate Shellfish Sanitation Conference.” Food and Drug Administration, National Shellfish
Sanitation Program Manual of Operation (1995).
202. Examples of solely private-sector standard setting include Responsible Care, an initiative of
the chemical industry, the ski industry’s Sustainable Slopes, and the Hotel Green Leaf Eco-Rating
Program.
203. For example, the Department of Agriculture’s Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point
Program and OSHA’s Voluntary Protection Program.
204. For instance, the Environmental Protection Agency’s Audit Policy provides penalty
reductions to firms that identify, voluntarily report, and correct environmental violations. Similarly,
the Department of Health and Human Services has a Provider Self-Disclosure Protocol that offers
leniency to health care providers who voluntarily report violations of their Medicare and Medicaid
obligations.
205. Eric Bregman & Arthur Jacobson, Environmental Performance Review: Self-Regulation in
Environmental Law, in Environmental Law and Ecological Responsibility: The Concept and
Practice of Ecological Self-Organization 207, 209 (Gunther Teubner et al. eds., 1994).
206. Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 543, 554 (2000)
(describing the use of “formally structured multistakeholder processes” in habitat conservation
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citizens to monitor the performance of regulated entities, as well as
information-based regulatory schemes that seek to influence the
behavior of regulated entities by “creat[ing] pressure from consumers,
208
neighbors, and shareholders.”
C. Findings: Coercive-State Anxiety and the Rise of SelfRegulation
The five most common criticisms of command-and-control regulation
are that it is: (1) coercive, (2) bureaucratic, (3) costly, (4) legalistic, and
209
(5) ineffective. While the relative frequency of these arguments varies
slightly from year to year, these fluctuations are infrequent and minor.
The overall thrust of the critique remains consistent from 1980 to 2005:
Regulation represents an unwarranted encroachment by the
government—through its bureaucrats and its laws—on the freedom and
autonomy of private individuals and businesses.
The single most common critique, raised in 39% (342) of the
articles, is that regulation is coercive. Command-and-control regulations

planning); James R. Rasband, The Rise of Urban Archipelagoes in the American West: A New
Reservation Policy?, 31 Envtl. L. 1, 64 (2001) (describing a program that elicits stakeholder
participation in developing wetlands policy); A. Dan Tarlock, A First Look at a Modern Legal Regime
for a “Post-Modern” United States Army Corps of Engineers, 52 U. Kan. L. Rev. 1285, 1317 (2004)
(“Stakeholder collaboration is an alternative to traditional command and control regulation . . . .”);
A. Dan Tarlock, Putting Rivers Back in the Landscape: The Revival of Watershed Management in the
United States, 6 Hastings W.-Nw. J. Envtl. L. & Pol’y 167, 187–89 (2000) (describing an approach that
elicits stakeholder participation in developing watershed management standards).
207. See Randall Peerenboom, Globalization, Path Dependency and the Limits of Law:
Administrative Law Reform and Rule of Law in the People’s Republic of China, 19 Berkeley J. Int’l
L. 161, 260 (2001) (“[I]nterest groups could shoulder more of the responsibility for monitoring
administrative behavior.”); Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural
Approach, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 458, 537–53 (2001) (describing a regulatory framework that relies on
employees to monitor employment discrimination in their workplaces); Barbara Ann Clay, Note, The
EPA’s Proposed Phase-III Expansion of the Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) Reporting Requirements:
Everything and the Kitchen Sink, 15 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 293, 303 (1997) (“[C]itizens play a critical
role in supplementing the EPA’s enforcement.”).
208. Warren A Braunig, Reflexive Law Solutions for Factory Farm Pollution, 80 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
1505, 1507 (2005) (“[T]he production and dissemination of information creates pressure from
consumers, neighbors, and shareholders and thus prompts companies to reduce their pollution, in the
absence of command-and-control regulation.”); see also David W. Case, Corporate Environmental
Reporting as Informational Regulation: A Law and Economics Perspective, 76 U. Colo. L. Rev. 379,
428 (2005) (“[M]arket incentives are an important ingredient, but not the sum total, of the overall
equation of information-based regulatory strategies. Social and normative factors also play an
important role.”); Errol E. Meidinger, The New Environmental Law: Forest Certification, 10 Buff.
Envtl. L.J. 211, 270 (2003) (“State imposed disclosure requirements can thus be seen as valuable
resources for civil society regulatory institutions.”); Cass R. Sunstein, Informational Regulation and
Informational Standing, Akins and Beyond, 147 U. Pa. L. Rev. 613, 626 (1998) (“A primary virtue of
informational regulation is that it triggers political safeguards and allows citizens a continuing
oversight role, one that is, in the best cases, largely self-enforcing.”).
209. See infra Figure B.
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210

are described as “wholly coercive instruments” that tell regulated
211
entities “exactly what to do and how to do it.” Authors argue that
what’s wrong with command-and-control regulations is that they “limit
[the regulated entity]’s choices in deciding how to reach the program
212
objectives.” Some commentators push the coercion metaphor further,
asserting variously that command-and-control regulation achieves its
213
objectives through “brute force,” that it elevates health and safety
214
regulators to the status of “product gods,” and that it has allowed
215
environmental enforcement officials to act as a “manure Gestapo.”

Figure B: Frequency of Arguments Against
Command and Control

210. Daniel H. Cole, Environmental Instrument Choice in a Second-Best World: A Comment on
Professor Richards, 10 Duke Envtl. L. & Pol’y F. 287, 293 (2000).
211. Camille V. Otero-Phillips, What’s in the Forecast? A Look at the EPA’s Use of Computer
Models in Emissions Trading, 24 Rutgers Computer & Tech. L.J. 187, 193 (1998).
212. Ronald P. Jackson, Extending the Success of the Acid Rain Provisions of the Clean Air Act: An
Analysis of the Clear Skies Initiative and Other Proposed Legislative and Regulatory Schemes to Curb
Multi-Pollutant Emissions from Fossil Fueled Electric Generating Plants, 12 U. Balt. J. Envtl. L. 91,
102 (2005).
213. Patrick S. Ryan, Application of the Public-Trust Doctrine and Principles of Natural Resource
Management to Electromagnetic Spectrum, 10 Mich. Telecomm. & Tech. L. Rev. 285, 372 (2004).
214. Thomas R. Mounteer, The Inherent Worthiness of the Struggle: The Emergence of Mandatory
Pollution Prevention Planning as an Environmental Regulatory Ethic, 19 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 251, 297
n.298 (1994).
215. Terence J. Centner, Concentrated Feeding Operations: An Examination of Current
Regulations and Suggestions for Limiting Negative Externalities, 25 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 219, 250
(2000).
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As this last example suggests, arguments about state coercion often
dovetail with its perceived instruments: namely, the bureaucratic structure
of government and the legalistic way in which regulations are enacted
and applied. The constraining power of bureaucracy is the second most
common argument, discussed in 30% (267) of the articles. Critiques of
bureaucracy range from structural concerns about the inability of a
216
to
remote central authority to regulate far-flung constituencies,
217
questions about the efficacy and integrity of bureaucrats. While not
always made explicit, many articles draw a direct analogy between
command-and-control regulation and Soviet-era bureaucracies. For
example:
Having the EPA determine the proper pollution control mechanisms
for a steel mill in Pittsburgh, a sugar refinery in Hawaii, or a power
plant in Mendocino is akin to having the Supreme Soviet determine
how much cotton Farmer Tolstoy should plant in Uzbekistan—an
218
experiment that was not wildly successful.

All of these arguments reflect “the longstanding fear that bureaucracy is
219
a form of human domination.”
The fourth most common argument, made in 23% (204) of the
articles, is that command-and-control regulation is rigidly legalistic. Like
coercion and bureaucracy, legalism represents another infringement on
individual autonomy. The sample articles critique legalism on several
levels, beginning with the sheer volume of law generated by regulatory
agencies: “Rules beget more rules in a seemingly inevitable process of
220
regulatory expansion.” The morass of law compounds the sense of
constraint felt by regulated entities, because it leaves them at the mercy

216. See Richard B. Stewart, A New Generation of Environmental Regulation? 29 Cap. U. L. Rev.
21, 21 (2001) [hereinafter Stewart, A New Generation] (describing the federal bureaucracy as “remote”
from local concerns); see also Richard B. Stewart, Environmental Quality as a National Good in a
Federal State, 1997 U. Chi. Legal F. 199, 206 (arguing that the centralized command-and-control
system cannot understand and respond to local variation).
217. See Jonathan Remy Nash, Too Much Market? Conflict Between Tradable Pollution
Allowances and the “Polluter Pays” Principle, 24 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 465, 528 (2000) (citing
bureaucrats’ “limited familiarity” with the business practices they regulate); see also Robert W.
Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. Rev. 1, 76 (1988) (describing bureaucrats as
“pesky”); Cymie Payne, Local Regulation of Natural Resources: Efficiency, Effectiveness, and Fairness
of Wetlands Permitting in Massachusetts, 28 Envtl. L. 519, 522 (1998) (suggesting that agency officials
seek their self-interest rather than the public interest); Cymie Payne, Reforming Environmental Law,
37 Stan. L. Rev. 1333, 1343 (1985) (describing bureaucrats as ill-informed).
218. Jerry L. Anderson, The Environmental Revolution at Twenty-Five, 26 Rutgers L.J. 395, 414
(1995).
219. Gerald E. Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 1276, 1277–
78 (1984). It is worth noting that this anxiety about bureaucracy, so prevalent in the legal literature, is
quite at odds with the classic Weberian view of bureaucracy as the most benign form of human
domination.
220. Daniel J. Fiorino, Toward a New System of Environmental Regulation: The Case for an
Industry Sector Approach, 26 Envtl. L. 457, 463 (1996).
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of regulators, who are accused of applying standards rigidly and
221
irrationally in a cycle of “mindless rule worship.” In addition, the
highly legalized environment renders regulated entities dependent on the
expertise of lawyers, and thus unable to act autonomously: “When a
body of law becomes so complex, it may be rendered virtually
222
incomprehensible in parts of the country where specialists are rare.”
These arguments about legalism ironically amount to a charge of
arbitrary lawlessness, the touchstone of tyrannical government.
Cost-based critiques are hardly absent from the legal debate,
representing the third most commonly made argument against
command-and-control regulation. But as Figure B makes clear, they do
not in any way dominate the debate. Even when aggregated with
efficiency critiques, which by themselves do not break the top five, these
classic economic concerns are overshadowed by anxieties about the
223
coercive state’s restrictions on freedom.

Figure C: Efficiency vs. Anti-Coercion Logics

221. Paul N. Cox, An Interpretation and (Partial) Defense of Legal Formalism, 36 Ind. L. Rev. 57,
74 (2003).
222. Anderson, supra note 218, at 413–14.
223. I do not include end-of-pipe, uniform, information, or interest-group arguments here, in part
because relatively fewer articles made them, and in part because articles used them to support broader
points about both efficiency and coercion. My coding scheme was not fine-grained enough to
distinguish which overarching concern was driving these arguments.
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Finally, it is worth noting that although many articles argue that
command-and-control regulation is ineffective, concerns about the
efficacy of regulation are swamped by concerns about both the cost and
the coerciveness of regulation. This disparity captures a fundamental
ambivalence about regulation: We are not entirely sure that we want
effective regulation if it would require costly government coercion of
private companies or citizens.
While the nature of the command-and-control critique remains
relatively constant over time, the priority of suggested reforms undergoes
a significant change, with self-regulation catching and overtaking market224
based regulation in the later years of the sample. Articles advocating
deregulation or liability-based regulation schemes are exceedingly scarce.
Despite the critique’s roots in the deregulation movement, only 4% (54)
of the articles mention this solution. Though deregulation is uniquely
responsive to the problem of state coercion, legal academics do not
225
widely embrace it as a reform.

Figure D: Trajectory of Alternatives to
Command and Control

The legal critique similarly eschews the classic legal ordering of tort
and tort-like remedies, mentioning them in only 5% (65) of the articles.
Although these alternatives are grounded in the notion of private
224. See Figure D.
225. As one staunch deregulation advocate at the University of Chicago observed, “[F]ew people,
indeed, believe that almost all regulation is bad, and by a singular coincidence a significant fraction of
the academic part of this group resides within a radius of one mile of my university.” Stigler, supra
note 9, at 167.
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ordering, they fail to abandon the coercive state tools so troubling to
legal critics of regulation—and arguably apply them even more
haphazardly. Consequently, liability-based remedies fail to address the
226
coercion concerns of the legal critique.
Market-based regulation has been the dominant reform paradigm
for more than two decades. A panoply of price-based instruments,
including emissions trading and other property-based regimes, regulatory
taxes, and “incentive” schemes, are discussed in 725 different articles.
Notably, that discussion of market-based regulation increases sharply
around 1991, the year that significant amendments to the Clean Air Act
were passed, including a sulfur dioxide emissions-trading program
227
designed to reduce acid rain. While these types of market-based
alternatives enjoy the most attention from commentators overall, selfregulation achieves the most significant rise over the course of the
sample, catching and surpassing market-based reforms in 2004. Note that
its ascent does not begin until 1996, but it continues to rise precipitously
after that. To be sure, it is a subtle shift that I have identified. Marketbased reforms have hardly been dethroned—they remain major players
in regulatory policy debates, especially in recent debates about regulating
228
carbon emissions. And, as discussed above, there is an affinity between
these two categories. Nevertheless, what I’ve documented here
represents an important shift in the way legal commentators
conceptualize regulation, its problems, and its solutions. Self-regulation
is an approach to governance that appears to be intimately bound up
with a critique that seeks noncoercive ways of governing.

226. It bears noting that tort liability runs counter to economic logics of regulation as well, making
it an unattractive alternative on multiple grounds. See, e.g., A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell,
The Uneasy Case for Product Liability, 123 Harv. L. Rev. 1437 (2010).
227. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (2011).
228. See generally Gary Bryner, Reducing Greenhouse Gases Through Carbon Market, 85 Denv.
U. L. Rev. 961 (2008) (advocating carbon trading as a way to internalize the costs of greenhouse gas
emissions); Jonas Monast, Integrating State, Regional, and Federal Greenhouse Gas Markets: Options
and Tradeoffs, 18 Duke Envtl. L. & Pol’y F. 329 (2008) (comparing regional/state carbon-market
initiatives and different alternatives for addressing greenhouse gas emissions through a federal capand-trade system); Carol M. Rose, From H2O to CO2: Lessons of Water Rights for Carbon Trading,
50 Ariz. L. Rev. 91 (2008) (using lessons from water-rights trading to analogize to cap-and-trade
proposals); Robert N. Stavins, A Meaningful U.S. Cap-and-Trade System to Address Climate Change,
32 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 293 (2008) (proposing a cap-and-trade system for the U.S. to reduce its
contributions of greenhouse gas emissions and responding to common objections regarding a cap-andtrade system).
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Figure E: Arguments for Alternatives, 1980–2005

The arguments made in support of various reforms strongly reflect a
229
desire to address the coercion concerns that emerge from the critique.
By far the most common argument supporting alternatives to command
and control is that they are flexible (244 articles), meaning that they
adopt a “respect for individual autonomy and initiative, and productive
230
potential.” Flexibility is an even more important driver of legal reform
than is cost-effectiveness, which appears in 179 articles as an argument
supporting a particular reform (27% less than flexibility). Self-regulation
was seen not only as a tool for flexibility, but as a way to repair the
damage that coercive government had done to relationships between
agencies and citizens. As a typical article supporting self-regulation
suggests, the approach offers a way to build “a constructive new
relationship with regulators and the public based on cooperation and
231
partnership rather than coercion and mistrust.”
Finally, my data demonstrate that in this literature there is a direct
relationship between self-regulation and concerns about coercion. Selfregulation alternatives are statistically correlated with arguments about

229. See Figure E.
230. Martha T. McClusky, Efficiency and Social Citizenship: Challenging the Neoliberal Attack on
the Welfare State, 78 Ind. L.J. 783, 876 (2003) (quoting Cass R. Sunstein, Free Markets and Social
Justice 271, 386 (1997)).
231. Stepan Wood, Environmental Management Systems and Public Authority in Canada:
Rethinking Environmental Governance, 10 Buff. Envtl. L.J. 129, 203–04 (2002–2003).
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coercion, while there is no correlation between coercion and market232
based alternatives. This is true of all three coercion-related codes:
direct arguments about the coercive state, as well as arguments about
bureaucracy and legalism, are all highly correlated with self-regulatory
solutions. Market-based reforms, by contrast, do not appear to respond
to this set of concerns. While there is much talk about markets and
freedom, the practical reality of market-based reforms, like administering
trading markets or imposing regulatory taxes, is that they require a great
deal of government initiative, planning, and management. It is difficult to
reconcile these tools with a deep-seated fear of state coercion because, at
base, they are designed to help government manipulate regulated entities
more effectively. Taken together, these findings suggest that, over the life
of the sample, legal scholarship “beg[ins] to converge on the concept of
233
self-regulation” as a tool for regulating without coercion.

Table 2: Correlations
Market
MarketBased

Self-Reg.

Coercion

Bureauc.

Legalistic

Pearson Correlation

1

Sig. (2-tailed)
N

1389

Pearson Correlation

-.491**

Sig. (2-tailed)

.000

N

1389

Pearson Correlation

-0.23

Self-Reg.

Coercion

Bureauc.

-.023

.016

-.051

.000

.392

.561

.058

1389

1389

1389

1389

.088**

.078**

.119**

.001

.003

.000

1389

1389

1389

.280**

.292**

-.491**

1
1389
.088**

1

Sig. (2-tailed)

.392

.001

N

1389

1389

1389

Pearson Correlation

.016

.078**

.280**

Sig. (2-tailed)

.561

.003

.000

N

1389

1389

1389

Pearson Correlation

-0.51

Legal

.000

.000

1389

1389

1

.300**
.000

1389

.119**

.292**

.300**

Sig. (2-tailed)

.058

.000

.000

.000

N

1389

1389

1389

1389

1389
1
1389

**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

D. Late Twentieth-Century Regulatory Reform in Historical
Context
These findings suggest the need to reevaluate conventional wisdom
about the stakes and meaning of regulatory reform. While economic
logics about cost and efficiency are clearly important strands of the
debate about regulation, they compete with anti-coercion logics that are

232. See Table 2.
233. Estlund, supra note 160, at 321.
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fundamentally incompatible with the project of regulating more
efficiently and effectively. Rather than breaking with the past, late
twentieth-century regulatory reform discourse remained continuous with
Americans’ understandings about federal government regulation and
coercion.
While it is important to recognize these continuities, I also want to
highlight the significant distinctions between contemporary and historical
tyrannophobic rhetoric. First, historical invocations of coercive-state
arguments were associated with tangible, even if not entirely credible,
fears that the U.S. government actually might assume tyrannical powers.
The Founders’ own experience with monarchy made concrete the
possibility that some group or individual might seize and exploit
consolidated state power. The rise of fascism in Europe during the 1930s,
coupled with its apparent success at resuscitating decimated European
economies, made it seem a viable political alternative to some during the
234
New Deal period. “As Hitler and Mussolini gained power and solved
their countries’ economic problems more successfully than did
democratic governments, talk of American dictatorship or communism
235
Similarly, during the Cold War,
was not irrelevant chatter.”
236
totalitarianism was seen as an “extraordinarily virulent” force, and
many feared that “democracy, at least as it was currently practiced in
America, might not be capable of withstanding totalitarian pressures
237
from within and without.”
Second, those deploying anti-statist rhetoric in earlier historical
debates explicitly articulated the connection between their
tyrannophobia and specific exercises of the government’s regulatory
powers. At the Founding, for instance, Anti-Federalists argued that
centralized governmental institutions like the Presidency and the Senate
would become vehicles for elites to seize power and wield it tyrannically
238
over the majority of citizens. During the New Deal, opponents of the
newly created administrative apparatus charged that it was already being
used as an instrument of tyranny, issuing lawless decisions grounded in
239
and engaging in
nothing more than the administrators’ whims
240
shameless political patronage to consolidate the president’s power.

234. Alpers, supra note 89, at 15 (recounting how Studebaker successfully marketed a car called
“The Dictator,” which it advertised as “a brilliant example of excess power,” from 1927 to 1937);
Ciepley, supra note 87, at 88 (“[W]hat was so disturbing about [the rise of fascism]—as disturbing as
the fact that dictators had been able to grab power in the first place—was that dictatorship evidently
worked.”).
235. Ciepley, supra note 87, at 88; Shepherd, supra note 4, at 1590.
236. Alpers, supra note 89.
237. Id.
238. See supra notes 44–58.
239. In an influential report to the American Bar Association, Roscoe Pound charged that
administrative law in the 1930s was “whatever is done administratively by administrative officials.”
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In totalitarian governments edicts and orders are issued by the heads of
the government, and they have the force and effect of law. There is no
appeal. The dictator is the law. When we allow Government bureaus to
make rules that are tantamount to laws, and then permit no appeal
241
from them, we are rapidly approaching the totalitarian state.

There was, in other words, a rational and explicitly articulated connection
(however remote) between the government’s actions and the expressed
fears of state tyranny in these debates.
This rationally and explicitly articulated connection begins to
become more attenuated in the postwar period, as “slippery slope” logic
comes to replace more concrete articulations of the relationship between
state power and tyranny. Under this axiomatic logic, “[a]ny economic
planning by the state must and has led to political tyranny and implies
242
the end of civilization.” By the time we arrive at the late twentiethcentury regulatory reform debate, both the plausibility of a tyrannical
government seizing power in the U.S. and the explanations underlying
the anxieties are gone. In their comparative study of tyrannophobia, Eric
Posner and Adrian Vermeule conclude that “current tyrannophobia can
only be of the irrational variety,” both because the establishment of a
dictatorship in the U.S. is so implausible and because harboring the fear
243
of one serves no prophylactic function. Perhaps because it has become
so unmoored from empirical reality, contemporary discourses of state
coercion also have become disconnected from any explicit elucidation of
what precisely is so coercive about state-based regulation.
While tyrannophobia in contemporary regulatory reform debates
defies reasoned argument, it invokes deeply ingrained schema or
cognitive scripts. Cognitive psychologists have demonstrated how schema
and scripts shape our understandings of the world and the possibilities
244
for action in it. Ronald Chen and John Hanson recently outlined what
they call the dominant “meta script” guiding U.S. policymaking since the
245
1980s: “markets good; regulation bad.” They argue that this simple
formulation offered a foundational principle that could be applied to
almost any policy issue, and U.S. policymakers began to see almost every

Pound, supra note 81, at 339.
240. Ernst, supra note 82, at 331.
241. Shepherd, supra note 4, at 1610 (quoting 86 Cong. Rec. H4534 (daily ed. Apr. 15, 1940)
(statement of Rep. Michener)).
242. Judith N. Shklar, After Utopia: The Decline of Political Faith 248–49 (1957).
243. See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 2, at 17.
244. See, e.g., Pierre Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice (1977); Douglas, supra note
39; Susan T. Fiske & Shelley E. Taylor, Social Cognition 98 (1991) (describing a “schema” as “a
cognitive structure that represents knowledge about a concept or type of stimulus, including its
attributes and the relations among those attributes”); William F. Sewell, A Theory of Structure:
Duality, Agency, and Transformation, 98 Am. J. Soc. 1 (1992).
245. Chen & Hanson, supra note 8, at 11.
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246

issue through this lens. They suggest that the “most compelling reason
offered for preferring markets to regulation is the idea that the former
247
sets people free, while the latter coerces them.” The key to the success
of the “regulation is bad” script is its ability to invoke threats to
248
freedom. These threats, and this metascript, pervade the discourse of
command-and-control regulation.
The repeated invocation of deeply ingrained cognitive scripts about
state-coercion and the failure to rationally articulate the precise nature of
the state-coercion problem creates a number of gaps in the logic of
regulatory reform. First, contemporary anti-coercion discourse does not
address why regulatory coercion is worse than other types of coercion by
the state. As discussed above, all forms of law have coercive elements.
Yet few, if any, of the legal critiques of regulation take issue with the
broader legal system backed by the state’s coercive power. The question
that regulatory reform discourse begs but never answers is: what makes
regulation distinctive, what makes it a particularly problematic exercise
of the state’s coercive power? Second, the contemporary discourse of
state coercion fails to address why government coercion in the form of
regulation is worse than private coercion. There is, of course, a highly
249
developed debate on this question that I will not reproduce here. The
point is that, unless qualified or elaborated somehow, the suggestion that
coercion is per se bad logically applies to the coercion that happens in
markets as well as to coercion by the state. Finally, contemporary
incantations of tyrannophobic rhetoric fail to follow arguments about
state coercion to their logical conclusion. Legal academics parrot the
Hayekian discourse of state tyranny and adopt its anti-coercion premises,
but they do not follow the discourse to its logical conclusion that every
state action is unwarranted authoritarianism. They do not abandon the
project of governance. Taken together, this makes for a highly
incoherent and debilitating discourse of regulatory reform.

V. Discussion and Conclusion
My analysis of the nearly 1400 law review articles that form the basis
of the legal critique of regulation from 1980 to 2005 demonstrates that
this discourse is structured by the fear of a coercive state and that this
fear is associated with the recent embrace of self-regulatory governance

246. Id. at 28.
247. Id. at 99.
248. Id. at 105 (“The ‘regulation is bad’ [script] is fueled largely by its conscious and subconscious
associations with freedom-reducing institutions—from fascism to communism and from socialism to
serfdom.”).
249. See, e.g., Richard Epstein, Imitations of Libertarian Thought, 15 Soc. Phil. & Pol’y 412 (1998);
Robert Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 Pol. Sci. Q. 470
(1923).
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models. The legal critique of command-and-control regulation is as much
250
an artifact of the U.S. “encounter with totalitarianism” as it is of the
legal academy’s encounter with economics, and this has consequences for
how we think about the possibilities and limitations of reform.
These findings are an important corrective to conventional
understandings of regulatory reform. Coercive-state anxiety has gone
largely unaddressed and sometimes explicitly denied by contemporary
legal scholars. Advocates of regulation see their task primarily as
overcoming arguments about the costs, benefits, and efficiency of
regulation rather than justifying the role of the state in it. This has left
coercive-state anxieties largely dismissed or ignored in serious
scholarship about regulation, allowing them to circulate freely.
Moreover, some have explicitly rejected the suggestion that totalitarian
anxieties play a significant role in legal thinking. Carl Landauer, for
instance, contends that while postwar social and political thought was
251
“driven by fear” of totalitarianism, legal scholars largely avoided this
252
He argues, by contrast, that legal academic culture was
trope.
253
“characterized by an often internalized attachment to government”
that made tyrannophobic rhetoric distinctly unappealing to legal
scholars, and he suggests that this identification with the state was
evident not only in the immediate postwar period, but at least through
254
the end of the twentieth century. Lawyers’ presumed attachment to
government has masked the ongoing salience of coercive-state anxiety in
legal literature and thinking about regulation.
My analysis holds important insights for ongoing and future
regulatory reform debates. First, U.S. discourse about state regulation—
even among experts and elites—has been historically and remains a
discourse about the coercive power of the state. Proponents of new or
expanded administration cannot make a durable, compelling case for
government regulation without recognizing and addressing these fears.
This entails, first, demanding that those who invoke coercive state
anxieties in opposition to particular regulatory initiatives articulate the
precise nature of state coercion they fear so that these concerns can be
engaged openly and honestly. As Stigler once admonished, the onus
should be on those opposed to the exercise of state power to provide
concrete answers to the question whether “government controls [have]
255
diminished our liberties, and if so, which ones and how much?”

250. Ciepley, supra note 87, at 2 (2006).
251. Carl Landauer, Deliberating Speed: Totalitarian Anxieties and Postwar Legal Thought,
12 Yale J.L. & Human. 171, 181 (2000).
252. Id.
253. Id. at 174.
254. Id.
255. Stigler, supra note 9, at 6.
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Second, addressing the fear of tyranny means opening a broader
dialogue about the role of the state in contemporary social and economic
life. Dialogue pitched solely at the level of costs and benefits or policy
advantages and disadvantages fails to address fundamental concerns
about how the state uses its coercive power. A case must be made for the
state before a case can be made for regulation.
New Deal discourse provides a useful model for this project. New
Dealers recognized a significant part of their challenge as defining (or
redefining) what a state is and what a state does. Roosevelt often
publicly articulated his vision that “governmental power was not
automatically evil. Power and evil were not the same thing; power could
be used for good as readily as for evil; power could only be judged in its
256
specific applications.”
What the New Dealers were getting at was that there could never be in
modern society a moratorium on the use of power. Power existed, it
was; if it were not held in one place it would be held in another. There
could not be a power vacuum. If government refused to exercise its
power, particularly in economic matters, there were those who would
exercise it privately, as New Dealers believed had been the case for
257
years.

Contemporary proponents of regulation must understand their
project as including a similar imperative to articulate an account of and
justification for the state. While its substance may differ from that
offered by the New Dealers, the imperative is no less pressing today.
This suggests the need for alternative narratives about the state’s
role in regulation. Kysar’s recent analysis of the precautionary principle
258
is one such effort to reconstitute the state as a regulatory actor.
Economic scholarship can also contribute to the resuscitation of the state
with research that highlights the conditions under which government’s
role in markets creates efficiencies. Coase clearly contemplates the
259
possibility of efficient state regulation in The Problem of Social Cost,
but this has not been the focus of regulatory reform scholarship to date.
It is urgent to create a conception of the “efficient state” or the “effective
state” that is as robust as the more critical conceptions of the state that
pervade the existing literature.
The third key insight as we move into the next big round of
discussion about regulatory reform is that the way regulation gets framed
as a problem shapes the solutions that get conceived and adopted, as well
as their prospects for success. The discourses and metaphors we use
reveal a great deal about how we perceive reality: “The unconscious

256.
257.
258.
259.

Wolfskill, supra note 67, at 60.
Id.
See generally Kysar, supra note 10.
See generally Coase, supra note 7.
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choice of symbols bares the bedrock of its beliefs. Moreover, the words
260
people use are not neutral artifacts; they shape ideas and behavior.”
Advocates of new regulatory initiatives should think carefully about how
to frame the problem of regulation and whether the reforms proposed
are responsive to the problems identified.
Many adverse consequences flow from the coercive-state framing of
the regulatory problem. First, it can lead reformers “to champion
misdirected or incomplete reforms and to ignore other viable approaches
261
for improving regulatory outcomes.” Most obviously, it devalues statedirected regulatory tools that might be useful, effective, or even efficient.
The discourse of coercion structures the dialogue of reform in a way that
privileges private over public regulatory tools and channels thinking
away from what government can do. For instance, some of the articles in
my sample conflate deterrence-based regulatory strategies with the
coercive-state problem even though empirical research has resoundingly
demonstrated the efficacy of many deterrence-based enforcement
262
practices. Approaching reform through the coercive-state lens “short263
circuits rational consideration” of the entire range of regulatory
alternatives and has resulted in the application of what might be
characterized as a reverse-precautionary principle, or a presumption
against the use of state power for regulatory purposes, even where state
power might be the best tool for the job.
Second, coercive-state discourse has woven an untenable
“regulatory logic” about the nature of regulated entities, their behavior,
and their motivations. The logic of coercive-state discourse sees
regulated entities as well-intentioned victims preyed upon by an
overbearing government. This is a questionable (or, at least, wildly
incomplete) account of regulatory behavior, and the inaccuracy of these

260. William E. Leuchtenburg, The New Deal and the Analogue of War, in Change and
Continuity in Twentieth-Century America 81, 81 (J. Braeman et al. eds., 1964).
261. Malloy, supra note 13, at 268.
262. For a selection of empirical work demonstrating that deterrence measures improve regulatory
compliance, see, for example, John Braithwaite & Toni Makkai, Testing an Expected Utility Model of
Corporate Deterrence, 25 Law & Soc’y Rev. 7 (1991); Wayne B. Gray & John T. Scholz, Analyzing the
Equity and Efficiency of OSHA Enforcement, 13 Law & Pol’y 185 (1991); Wayne B. Gray & John T.
Scholz, Does Regulatory Enforcement Work? A Panel Analysis of OSHA Enforcement, 27 Law &
Soc’y Rev. 177 (1993); Wayne B. Gray & Ronald Shadbegian, When and Why Do Plants Comply?
Paper Mills in the 1980s, 27 Law & Pol’y 238 (2005); Neil Gunninghan, Dorothy Thornton & Robert
A. Kagan, Motivating Management: Corporate Compliance in Environmental Protection, 27 Law &
Pol’y 289 (2005); K. Kuperan & Jon G. Sutinen, Blue Water Crime: Deterrence, Legitimacy, and
Compliance in Fisheries, 32 Law & Soc’y Rev. 309 (1998); Wesley A. Magat & W. Kip Viscusi,
Effectiveness of the EPA’s Regulatory Enforcement: The Case of Industrial Effluent Standards, 33 J.L.
Econ. 331 (1990); Jay P. Shimshack & Michael B. Ward, Regulator Reputation, Enforcement, and
Environmental Compliance, 50 J. Envtl. Econ. & Mgmt. 519 (2005); Jodi Short & Michael W. Toffel,
Coerced Confessions: Self-Policing in the Shadow of the Regulator, 24 J.L. Econ. & Org. 45 (2008).
263. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 2, at 3.

Short_63-HLJ-633 (Do Not Delete)

682

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

3/26/2012 5:18 PM

[Vol. 63:633

assumptions may account for some of the recent regulatory misfires
attributed to voluntary regulation.
Third, to the extent that it has helped curtail deterrence-based
activities by regulators, coercive-state discourse not only circumscribes
regulatory options in the ways I have described, but it also hampers the
efficacy of the very “self-regulatory” tools it has spawned. While
voluntary and cooperative approaches to regulation can be useful
techniques, recent empirical work demonstrates that they work best
when embedded within a more coercive, deterrence-based enforcement
264
scheme. A simultaneous move toward self-regulation and away from
more coercive forms of state-based regulation risks undermining and
discrediting both regulatory approaches.
Finally, perhaps the most troubling implication of pervasive
coercive-state discourse in the regulatory field is that it may have the
effect of masking or diminishing coercive exercises of state power in
other arenas. While anxiety about the coercive state is not necessarily
unfounded, its deep entrenchment in the regulatory field may be, at best,
misplaced. To borrow Richard Epstein’s objection to Robert Hale’s
characterization of routine market transactions as “coercive,” treating
state actions such as regulatory rulemaking and enforcement as coercive
“deprives that term of its necessary and proper sting in cases of
265
aggression and force.” In an historical era marked by extraordinary
renditions, secret wiretapping of U.S. citizens, torture, indefinite
detentions, and mass incarceration, there is ample and urgent reason to
be vigilant about coercive exercises of state power. It is not clear,
however, that regulation represents a pressing locus of this concern.
What is needed is an open and explicit conversation about what state
coercion is, where it exists, and under what circumstances it might and
might not be justifiable. If it turns out that social and economic
regulation raise genuine state-coercion concerns, they should be
addressed directly. If these concerns turn out to be ill-placed, we should
radically rework the way we think and talk about regulation and its
reform.

264. See, e.g., Eric Helland, The Enforcement of Pollution Control Laws: Inspections, Violations,
and Self-Reporting, 80 Rev. Econ. & Stat. 141 (1998); Andrew A. King & Michael J. Lenox, Industry
Self-Regulation Without Sanctions: The Chemical Industry’s Responsible Care Program, 43 Acad.
Mgmt. J. 698 (2000); Short & Toffel, supra note 262; Jodi Short & Michael W. Toffel, Making SelfRegulation More than Merely Symbolic: The Critical Role of the Legal Environment, 55 Admin. Sci. Q.
361 (2010); Paul B. Stretesky & Jackie Gabriel, Self-Policing and the Environment: Predicting SelfDisclosure of Clean Air Act Violations Under the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s Audit
Policy, 18 Soc. & Nat. Resources 871 (2005).
265. Epstein, supra note 249, at 434.
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Methodological Appendix
A. Content Analysis as a Methodological Approach
Content analysis is the empirical study of discourse. This
266
methodology is widely used in the social sciences and humanities, and it
is gaining popularity among legal scholars for what it can add to
267
traditional interpretive techniques. First, it combines the depth of
interpretive methods with the critical distance and rigor of empirical
methods. This marriage allows latent themes in a discourse to emerge,
unclouded by taken-for-granted understandings and conventional
narratives about its meaning. As one recent survey and synthesis of legal
content analyses put it, the method has “‘considerable power for the
268
discovery of anomalies which may escape the naked eye.’” Second,
content analysis permits a sweeping inquiry of a large body of texts that
269
simply is not possible using conventional interpretive methods. Here, it
allows me to assess the broad spectrum of legal literature on regulatory
reform as opposed to isolated debates within this literature. Finally, the
systematic coding technique produces a data set that can be analyzed
270
quantitatively. This enables me to “describe patterns and associations”
over time that might not be visible through more traditional interpretive
methods.

266. See, e.g., Russell J. Dalton et al., Partisan Cues and the Media: Information Flows in the 1992
Presidential Election, 92 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 111 (1998) (using content analysis to establish the nature
of information flows in the news coverage of the 1992 presidential campaign); William A. Gamson,
Coalition Formation at Presidential Nominating Conventions, 68 Am. J. Soc. 157 (1965) (using content
analysis of newspaper articles to determine the attitudes of different groups toward political
candidates); Herman R. Lantz et al., The Preindustrial Family in America: A Further Examination of
Early Magazines, 79 Am. J. Soc. 566 (1973) (using content analysis of popular periodicals to investigate
preindustrial American family patterns); James W. Prothro, Verbal Shifts in the American Presidency:
A Content Analysis, 50 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 726 (1956) (using content analysis to identify shifts toward
conservative discourse in presidential speeches); Abigail J. Steward et al., Coding Categories for the
Study of Child-Rearing from Historical Sources, 5 J. Interdisc. Hist. 687 (1975) (coding English childrearing journals to analyze shifts in women’s authority in the family).
267. See, e.g., Catherine T. Albiston, Bargaining in the Shadow of Social Institutions: Competing
Discourses and Social Change in Workplace Mobilization of Civil Rights, 39 Law & Soc’y Rev. 11
(2005) (using content analysis techniques and coding software to analyze interview data); Robert M.
Howard & Jeffrey A. Segal, An Original Look at Originalism, 36 Law & Soc’y Rev. 113 (2002) (coding
the text of legal briefs to test whether textual arguments drove the constitutional interpretation
decisions of Supreme Court justices); Malloy, supra note 13 (conducting content analysis and
analyzing the citation patterns of articles on environmental regulatory reform); Roberta Romano,
Does the Sarbanes-Oxley Act Have a Future?, 26 Yale J. on Reg. 229 (2009) (using content analysis of
major newspapers’ critiques of Sarbanes-Oxley to try to explain the politics of revising the legislation).
268. Mark A. Hall & Ronald F. Wright, Systematic Analysis of Judicial Opinions, 96 Calif. L. Rev.
63, 65 (2008) (quoting Alan L. Tyree, Fact Content Analysis of Case Law: Methods and Limitations,
22 Jurimetrics J. 1, 23 (1981)).
269. Id.
270. Id. at 81.
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B. Constructing the Sample
To identify the arguments that formed the core of the legal critique
of regulation, I constructed a database of all law review articles archived
in the LexisNexis database that discuss regulation using the term
“command and control.” The exact search I performed, in LexisNexis
syntax, was: (“command and control” w/s regulat!). The search was
designed, after much experimentation with similar search-term
combinations, to retrieve as many relevant articles as possible while
271
minimizing the number of off-topic article hits. This yielded a sample of
1389 articles between 1980 and 2005. To identify the relevant portions of
the included articles, I captured excerpts of the articles comprised of 100
words on either side of the search terms each time they appeared in the
272
article.
My sample encompasses articles from the entire range of legal
topics and regulatory fields. Early discussion of command-and-control
regulation by legal scholars occurs largely in the context of administrative
law and general regulatory issues. However, environmental law quickly
comes to dominate the discussion about regulation and its reform.
Overall, 58% (803) of the articles in my sample are in the environmental
field. The only other truly significant topic area is administrative law and
general regulatory topics, with 147 articles, or 11% of the total.
Communications and health care each represent around 5% of the
sample. Other topics, including energy and workplace regulation,
represent only about 2% of the sample each. International topics become
much more important in the 1990s and 2000s, but most of these articles
are about global environmental issues and thus are encompassed by that
field.
A number of factors may contribute to the prominence of
environmental law in this debate. The high costs of compliance with
environmental regulation galvanized political support in the business
community for environmental regulatory reform. Advocates of
environmental regulation were mobilized and well-funded, arguably
insulating the Environmental Protection Agency from capture to a
greater degree than other agencies. Environmental regulation’s focus on
production processes might have made it appear to infringe more

271. The biggest difficulty was eliminating articles arising from military tribunals discussing the
structure of “command and control” in particular units.
272. In order to create a manageable database for coding, I excerpted the portions of these articles
that actually discuss command-and-control regulation by capturing fifty words on either side of my
search terms. I experimented with several “KWIC” lengths and settled on fifty words as the one that
best captured the arguments each article was making specifically about command-and-control
regulation, with the least extraneous material present. Of course, such a method risks omitting some
relevant material. However, to the extent this has occurred, omitted material would be distributed
equally among the articles and thus should not bias my results.
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significantly on private prerogatives than did regulation targeting
outcomes. Finally, prominent scholars who were early leaders in the
regulatory reform debate happened to be writing in the environmental
273
field. While it is interesting to contemplate the significance and
distinctiveness of environmental law in the regulatory reform debate, the
prevalence of environmental law articles does not distort my overall
findings and conclusions. Statistical tests found no significant difference
between the composition of the arguments and the recommendations for
reform in environmental law articles and articles in other fields.
Nonetheless, it is important to consider how the implications of my
analysis may vary across different areas of law.
C. Coding the Articles
I hand-coded each article excerpt along four dimensions: (1) What is
the article’s stance on command-and-control regulation (pro, con, or
neutral)? (2) What arguments does it make in support of this stance?
(Or, in the case of neutral articles, what arguments does it make on both
sides?) (3) What reforms, if any, does it propose? (4) What arguments
does it make about those reforms? I identified the key arguments to code
for based on a close reading of articles that are widely cited in the
274
literature on command-and-control regulation, as well as through the
emergent process of coding. I added codes and went back through
previous documents to recode as the importance of new arguments
275
emerged. I coded each argument only once per document. I coded for
proposed reforms in any article excerpt that discusses one of these
reforms, regardless of whether the excerpt advocates, denigrates, or
simply acknowledges that the reform exists. I use this coding approach
both to minimize interpretive difficulties and to reflect the universe of
viable reforms that existed at any given time. In this way, my
methodology is designed to capture the appearance and salience of ideas
in the debate. I used electronic coding software to record the codes and
tally their frequency.
An article was considered “pro” if it explicitly stated its support for
command-and-control regulation or if it had only positive things to say
about it. Similarly, articles were coded “con” if they explicitly stated their
273. E.g., Bruce A. Ackerman & William T. Hassler, Clean Coal/Dirty Air (1981); Ackerman &
Stewart, supra note 9; Krier & Stewart, supra note 162. Richard Stewart is the most widely cited author in
the legal regulatory reform debate, cited in 452 of the articles in my sample; Bruce Ackerman is cited in
313 articles. Cass Sunstein is the only other author cited with such frequency (389 times).
274. E.g., Ackerman & Hassler, supra note 273; Ayres & Braithwaite, supra note 200; Breyer,
supra note 9; Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 9; Howard Latin, Ideal Versus Real Regulatory
Efficiency: Implementation of Uniform Standards and “Fine-Tuning” Regulatory Reforms, 37 Stan. L.
Rev. 1267 (1985); Richard B. Stewart, Regulation, Innovation, and Administrative Law, 69 Calif. L.
Rev. 437 (1981).
275. All coding is binary, coded “1” if a particular attribute is present and “0” otherwise.
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opposition to command-and-control regulation or if they made only
negative statements about it. Articles were coded “neutral” if they made
both pro and con arguments about command-and-control regulation but
did not explicitly express support for or opposition to it or if they used
the term “command and control” without commenting on it.
In addition to these broad categories, I hand-coded the article
excerpts in my sample for the arguments made against command-andcontrol regulation and the recommended reforms. The ten most common
arguments made against command-and-control regulation were: cost,
inefficient, coercive, bureaucracy, legalistic, end-of-pipe, uniform,
information, interest group, and ineffective. Below, I discuss the coding
criteria for each and provide examples of articles falling under each code.
To bolster the reliability of my findings, I coded against my conclusions.
For instance, as described below, I coded the non-coercion categories,
like cost and efficiency, using extremely broad criteria, and I coded the
coercion categories based on more narrow, specific criteria.
276
My coding of cost, for instance, is highly inclusive,
Cost:
encompassing all articles that modify “command and control” with
adjectives like “costly” or “expensive.” Also included in this code are
articles that discuss the marginal costs of regulation.
277
Inefficient: Articles are included in this code if they argue that
command-and-control regulation is itself inefficient or that it causes

276. Representative examples from my database of the kinds of articles coded “cost” include: John
W. Bagby et al., How Green Was My Balance Sheet?: Corporate Liability and Environmental
Disclosure, 14 Va. Envtl. L.J. 225, 228 (1995) (noting that “soaring compliance costs” have prompted
regulatory reform experiments); E. Donald Elliott, Environmental Markets and Beyond: Three Modest
Proposals for the Future of Environmental Law, 29 Cap. U. L. Rev. 245, 253 (2001) (arguing that
command-and-control environmental regulations “waste industry’s money”); Jesse Ratcliffe,
Reenvisioning the Risk Bubble: Utilizing a System of Intra-Firm Risk Trading for Environmental
Protection, 92 Calif. L. Rev. 1779, 1823 (2004) (arguing that the command-and-control approach to
environmental regulation is “not cost effective”); Richard B. Stewart, The Administrative Process: The
Discontents of Legalism: Interest Group Relations in Administrative Regulation, 1985 Wis. L. Rev. 655,
660 (discussing the “high social and economic costs” of regulation); W. Kip Viscusi, Reply, Structuring
an Effective Occupational Disease Policy: Victim Compensation and Risk Regulation, 2 Yale J. on
Reg. 53, 61 (1984) (arguing that command-and-control regulation of occupational disease
compensation would “reduce employers’ flexibility to meet health goals in the most cost-effective
manner”); Bruce Yandle, Mr. Lomborg and the Common Law, 53 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 285, 290
(2002) (stating that we are only beginning to recognize the “real cost of implementing and living with a
multitude of environmental regulations”); Mark Emery, Note, Regulating Televised News: A New
Season for the Public Interest Standard, 19 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol’y 737, 784 (2005)
(suggesting that command-and-control regulation of television news content “could raise expenses for
outlets such that it will drive them out of the news business”); Lori May Peters, Comment, Reloading
the Arsenal in the Information War About Pollution—Citizens as Soldiers in the Fight and How a Lack
of “Actionable” Legs on Which to Stand Nearly Forced a Cease-Fire, 10 Vill. Envtl. L.J. 127, 162
(1999) (criticizing “expensive command and control techniques”).
277. Representative examples from my database of the kinds of articles coded “inefficient”
include: Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 9, at 1339 (discussing “the serious inefficiency of traditional
forms of command-and-control regulation”); Elliott, supra note 276, at 253 (“[W]e should condemn
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inefficiencies or distortions in the operations of markets or regulated
firms. I also include in this code articles that discuss inefficiency as a
concept without using the term, such as those arguing, for example, that
“attempts at command and control regulation of the labor market will
lead to distortions of both the labor market and of the legal system.
278
Markets require winners and losers to operate.”
279
Coercive: Articles categorized under this code make arguments
about the coercive nature of state intrusions into private affairs.
Specifically, articles coded as “coercive” either: (1) describe commandand-control regulation or the agencies that administer it as “coercive” or
in comparable terms such as “threatening,” “imposing,” or “controlling,”
or (2) state that command-and-control regulation restricts the freedom of
regulated entities in some way.
the overuse of inefficient command-and-control systems.”); Neil Gunningham & Darren Sinclair,
Integrative Regulation: A Principle-Based Approach to Environmental Policy, 24 Law & Soc. Inquiry
853, 859 (1999) (arguing that command-and-control regulation “commonly proves to be inflexible and
inefficient”); Harold J. Krent & Nicholas S. Zeppos, Monitoring Governmental Disposition of Assets:
Fashioning Regulatory Substitutes for Market Controls, 52 Vand. L. Rev. 1703, 1754 (1999)
(“Command and control regulation, even if motivated by the public interest, was inefficient . . . .”);
Andrew P. Morriss, Bad Data, Bad Economics, and Bad Policy: Time to Fire Wrongful Discharge Law,
74 Tex. L. Rev. 1901, 1934 (1996) (“[A]ttempts at command and control regulation of the labor market
will lead to distortions of both the labor market and of the legal system. Markets require winners and
losers to operate.”); Stewart, A New Generation, supra note 216, at 28 (discussing the “inherent
inefficiencies of the command system” of regulation); Cass R. Sunstein, Television and the Public Interest,
88 Calif. L. Rev. 499, 563 (2000) (discussing the inefficiencies of command-and-control regulation).
278. Morriss, supra note 277, at 1934.
279. Representative examples from my database of the kinds of articles coded “coercive” include:
Robert B. Adhieh, Between Mandate and Market: Contract Transition in the Shadow of the
International Order, 53 Emory L.J. 691, 761 (2004) (suggesting that “mandate and coercion” are the
central mechanisms of command-and-control regulation); Marshall J. Berger, Regulatory Flexibility
and the Administrative State, 32 Tulsa L.J. 325, 353 n.9 (1996) (“Our regulatory system has become an
instructional manual. It tells us and bureaucrats exactly what to do and how to do it. Detailed rule
after detailed rule addresses every eventuality, or at least every situation lawmakers and bureaucrats
can think of.” (quoting Philip K. Howard, The Death of Common Sense 10–11 (1996))); Gary C.
Bryner, Policy Devolution and Environmental Law: Exploring the Transition to Sustainable
Development, 26 Environs Envtl. L. & Pol’y J. 1, 5 (2003) (criticizing command-and-control
regulation for “the restraints on freedom it imposes”); Cole, supra note 210, at 293 (2000) (describing
command-and-control regulations as “wholly coercive instruments”); E. Donald Elliott,
Environmental TQM: Anatomy of a Pollution Control Program that Works!, 92 Mich. L. Rev. 1840,
1849 (1994) (reviewing Quality Envtl. Mgmt. Subcomm., President’s Commission on Envtl.
Quality, Total Quality Management: A Framework for Pollution Prevention (1993)) (describing
command-and-control regulation as a system based on “governmental threat, ‘backed ultimately by
the U.S. Army.’”); Daniel J. Fiorino, Rethinking Environmental Regulation: Perspectives on Law and
Governance, 23 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 441, 448 (1999) (describing “[t]he heavy hand of regulation,
which aims to control behavior directly”); Jon D. Hanson et al., Smokers’ Compensation: Toward a
Blueprint for Federal Regulation of Cigarette Manufacturers, 22 S. Ill. U. L.J. 519, 524 (1998) (“Under
command-and-control regulation . . . [t]he regulator in effect tells the regulated firm how specifically
to run some aspect of its business” (emphasis omitted)); John V. Jacobi, Competition Law’s Role in
Health Care Quality, 11 Annals Health L. 45, 49 (2002) (“[In a command and control regulatory
system], governmental judgment replaces that of the industry with regulators making direct
instrumental decisions about how care should be delivered.”); Marshall B. Kapp, Enhancing
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Autonomy and Choice in Selecting and Directing Long-Term Care Services, 4 Elder L.J. 55, 70 (1996)
(arguing that command-and-control regulation of health care acts “as an inflexible barrier to
appropriate client choice”); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr. & A. Richard M. Blaiklock, Enhancing the
Spectrum: Media Power, Democracy, and the Marketplace of Ideas, 2000 U. Ill. L. Rev. 813, 865
(describing a system of “heavy-handed command and control regulations that would mandate the
airing of particular amounts of politically favored programming”); Timothy F. Malloy, Disclosure
Stories, 32 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 617, 672 (2005) (noting that command-and-control disclosure
regulations “may be viewed as an offensive intrusion into the firm’s internal decisionmaking
routines”); Owen, supra note 11, at 690 (2003) (arguing that command-and-control regulation “limits
the ability of potential spectrum users to obtain [spectrum] access”); Richard H. Pildes, Forward: The
Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 28, 95 (2004) (“Like all command-andcontrol legislation, the Act did not allow regulated actors latitude to make decisions about how most
effectively, in their own diverse contexts, to realize the aims of the Act.”); Nicholas A. Robinson,
Legal Systems, Decisionmaking, and the Science of Earth’s Systems: Procedural Missing Links,
27 Ecology L.Q. 1077, 1126 (2001) (noting that some believe that command-and-control
environmental regulation “threatens today’s lifestyles and the progress that produced contemporary
prosperity”); Adam Rose, Greenhouse Gas Mitigation Action Planning: An Overview, 12 Penn St.
Envtl. L. Rev. 153, 161 (2004) (arguing that command and control is “a strict regulatory approach”
that “limits freedom of choice”); J.B. Ruhl, Biodiversity Conservation and the Ever-Expanding Web of
Federal Laws Regulating Nonfederal Lands: Time for Something Completely Different?, 66 U. Colo. L.
Rev. 555, 625 (1995) (describing the command-and-control approach of the Endangered Species Act
and the Clean Water Act the “‘Coercion’ model”); J.B. Ruhl, Endangered Species Act Innovations in
the Post-Babbittonian Era—Are There Any?, 14 Duke Envtl. L. & Pol’y F. 419, 427 (2004) (criticizing
command-and-control regulation as a “prescriptive regulation approach”); James Salzman, Creating
Markets for Ecosystem Services: Notes From the Field, 80 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 870, 884 (2005) (“Through
prescription, the government relies on command-and-control regulation, mandating certain behaviors,
proscribing others, and imposing penalties for noncompliance. ‘Thou shalt do this; thou shalt not do
that, or else . . . .’”); Sargentich, supra note 199, at 421 (“[C]ommand-and-control regulat[ions] . . .
restrict considerably the options of the industry being regulated” (internal quotation marks omitted));
Richard B. Stewart, United States Environmental Regulation: A Failing Paradigm, 15 J.L. & Com. 585,
589 (1996) (discussing the “coercive logic of the command paradigm”); Barton H. Thompson, Jr., What
Good Is Economics?, 27 Environs Envtl. L. & Pol’y J. 175, 199 (2003) (“Indeed, regulation may
eliminate self-determination even more completely than incentive payments, since regulation requires
compliance while incentive payments still permit individual choice.”); Robert Wai, Transnational
Private Law and Private Ordering in a Contested Global Society, 46 Harv. Int’l L.J. 471, 475 (2005)
(stating that in command-and-control regulation, the state is a “dominant” actor); Wood, supra note
231, at 204 (arguing that command-and-control regulation is based on “coercion and mistrust”); David
Zlotlow, 30 Ecology L.Q. 213, 213 (2003) (reviewing Regulating from the Inside: Can
Environmental Management Systems Achieve Policy Goals? (Cary Coglianese and Jennifer Nash
eds., 2001)) (stating that command-and-control regulation “imposes unwanted obligations on
businesses”); Kelli L. Dutrow, Note and Comment, Working at Home at Your Own Risk: Employer
Liability for Teleworkers Under the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 18 Ga. St. U. L. Rev.
955, 995 n.280 (2002) (arguing that command-and-control regulations “treat Americans like children in
need of the protection of ‘big brother’ government” (quoting OSHA Home Office Regulations:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Educ. and the
Workplace, 106th Cong. (2000) (statement of Rep. Ron Paul))); John F. Temple, Comment, The Kyoto
Protocol: Will It Sneak Up on the U.S.?, 28 Brook. J. Int’l L. 213, 218 (2002) (“The traditional
command-and-control model, in the environmental sense, refers to regulations that require entities to
adopt certain procedures and technologies in order to meet their reduction standards set by the
government.”); Mary Ann King, Comment, Getting Our Feet Wet: An Introduction to Water Trusts,
28 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 495, 511 (2004) (describing command and control as a more “threatening”
option than other regulatory alternatives); Stacy Laira Lozner, Note, Diffusion of Local Regulatory
Innovations: The San Francisco CEDAW Ordinance and the New York City Human Rights Initiative,
104 Colum. L. Rev. 768, 772 (2004) (explaining that the command-and-control approach addresses
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280

Bureaucracy: Articles are coded as making bureaucracy critiques if
they: (1) deploy the adjective “bureaucratic” as an epithet, (2) criticize
the centralized or top-down structure of regulatory government, (3) draw
analogies between U.S. regulatory agencies and Soviet bureaucracies, or
(4) criticize the efficacy or integrity of bureaucrats.
281
Legalistic: Articles fall under this code if they: (1) critique the
volume of law generated by regulatory agencies, (2) the “rigid” or
legalistic ways in which regulators apply these rules to regulated entities,
or (3) the demand for and dependence on the expertise of lawyers
generated by such a system.

social problems by “imposing and enforcing, in top-down fashion, tough binding rules”).
280. Representative examples from my database of the kinds of articles coded “bureaucracy”
include: Richard Briffault, Reforming Campaign Finance Reform: A Review of Voting with Dollars,
91 Calif. L. Rev. 643, 650 (2003) (criticizing command-and-control regulation for its reliance on
“bureaucrats in determining which candidates get public funding and how much they get”); Michael C.
Dorf, After Bureaucracy, 71 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1245, 1251 (2004) (“[T]here remains little faith in what
people regard as the characteristic institutional form of the New Deal-Great Society constitutional
order: bureaucracy, understood as regulation by centralized command and control.”); C. Douglas
Floyd, Plain Ambiguities in the Clear Articulation Requirement for State Action Antitrust Immunity:
The Case of State Agencies, 41 B.C. L. Rev. 1059, 1077 (2000) (describing a “system of centralized
‘command and control’ regulation”); Michael S. Greve, Friends of the Earth, Foes of Federalism,
12 Duke Envtl. L. & Pol’y F. 167, 181 (2001) (“Environmental regulation in particular rests on the
premise that an infinitely complex, fragile, and precious environment can be protected only through a
centralized, ‘Soviet-style’ command-and-control scheme.”); Jacobi, supra note 279, at 69 (describing
command-and-control regulation as a tool enabling government to act as a “micromanager of health
systems”); Stanley G. Long, Transport at the Millennium: Preface to the Millennium, 553 Annals Am.
Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 8, 16 n.7 (questioning the location of transportation regulation entirely within
the “public sector, where rigidities are apt to occur and where management on average is less
effective”); Peter M. Manus, The Owl, the Indian, the Feminist, and the Brother: Environmentalism
Encounters the Social Justice Movements, 23 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 249, 290 (1996) (criticizing
command-and-control regulation for its reliance on the “top-down, government mandate method”);
Peerenboom, supra note 207, at 253 (describing command-and-control regulation as “hierarchical, topdown, overly centralized”); David B. Spence, Paradox Lost: Logic, Morality, and the Foundations of
Environmental Law in the 21st Century, 20 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 145, 175 (1995) (characterizing
command and control as a “Leviathan-type solution”); Stewart, supra note 276, at 670 (describing the
distortions that occur when command-and-control regulation is “highly centralized at the federal
level”); Stewart, A New Generation, supra note 216, at 21 (describing the command-and-control
system as one that “relies on a remote centralized bureaucratic apparatus”).
281. Representative examples from my database of the kinds of articles coded “legalistic” include:
Estlund, supra note 160, at 341 (describing “regulators’ excessive zeal, rigidity, and adversarialism” in
applying command-and-control regulations); Neil A. Gunningham, Towards Effective and Efficient
Enforcement of Occupational Health and Safety Regulation: Two Paths to Enlightenment, 19 Comp.
Lab. L. & Pol’y J. 547, 558 (1998) (arguing that we should move away from a command-and-control
system of occupational health and safety regulation that entails “direct intervention of the legal system
itself through its agencies, highly detailed statutes, or delegation of great powers to the courts”);
Lozner, supra note 279, at 772 (describing command-and-control regulation as the “characteristically
rule-based and rule-bound regulatory model”); Kenneth M. Murchison, Environmental Law in
Australia and the United States: A Comparative Overview, 22 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 503, 548 (1995)
(arguing that courts will become increasingly involved in regulatory disputes as the amount of
regulation increases); Daniel P. Selmi, Experimentation and the “New” Environmental Law, 27 Loy.
L.A. L. Rev. 1061, 1074 (1994) (criticizing the “rigid procedural uniformity” of command-and-control
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282

End-of-Pipe: This code describes an approach to regulation that
addresses problems only after the fact and fails to deal with their root
causes or to incentivize harm prevention.
283
Articles categorized under this code argue that
Uniform:
command-and-control regulation unwisely applies identical standards to
a broad range of disparate circumstances. Uniformity is said to make
284
such regulation a “clumsy,” “one-shoe-fits-all” approach that “fails to
take into account the unique quality of the industry being regulated, and
285
the pollution generated by that industry.”
environmental law); Paulette L. Stenzel, Can the ISO 14000 Series Environmental Management
Standards Provide a Viable Alternative to Government Regulation?, 37 Am. Bus. L.J. 237, 256 (2000)
(“Federal environmental regulations fill more than 20,000 pages of the Federal Register alone, with
thousands of additional regulations at the state and local levels.”); Kurt A. Strasser, Pollution Control
in an Era of Economic Redevelopment, 8 Conn. J. Int’l L. 425, 432 (1993) (“[R]egulations have
become increasingly complex, even though gains in environmental protection have slowed.”);
Sunstein, supra note 277, at 534 (describing the “rigid mandates” of command-and-control
telecommunications regulation); Zlotlow, supra note 279 (describing command and control’s reliance
on “rigid process-based standards”).
282. Representative examples from my database of the kinds of articles coded “end-of-pipe”
include: Stuart L. Deutsch, Environmental Law: Setting Priorities: Principles to Improve
Environmental Policy, 68 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 43, 46 (1992) (“The programs emphasize the use of
technology at the end of the pipe to control the pollution which is generated by industrial processes,
motor vehicles, and other sources. However, remarkably little effort has been expended to prevent the
generation of pollution.”); Alana M. Fuierer, The Anti-Chlorine Campaign in the Great Lakes: Should
Chlorinated Compounds Be Guilty Until Proven Innocent?, 43 Buff. L. Rev. 181, 228 n.111 (1995)
(“’End of the pipe’ regulation, or command and control regulation, involves the management and
control of pollution discharges after they have been produced.”); Krier & Stewart, supra note 162, at
28 (arguing that command-and-control regulation “fails to accommodate and stimulate innovation in
resource-efficient means of pollution prevention”); Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The Costs of
Cigarettes: The Economic Case for Ex Post Incentive-Based Regulation, 107 Yale L.J. 1163, 1326
(1998) (“[Marketing] restrictions [on cigarettes] may prevent manufacturers from effectively
marketing healthier cigarettes, thereby reducing the companies’ incentives to develop such
cigarettes.”); Paula C. Murray, Inching Toward Environmental Regulatory Reform—ISO 14000: Much
Ado About Nothing or a Reinvention Tool?, 37 Am. Bus. L.J. 35, 44 (1999) (“[S]trict command-andcontrol regulation leaves little room for continual improvement.”); Ralph R. Peterson, Government,
the Private Sector, and NGO Roles in the Next Generation of U.S. Environmental Policy, 13 Colo. J.
Int’l Envtl. L. & Pol’y 87, 92 (2002) (arguing that we should look for a system that is “more focused
on resource efficiency (pollution prevention and waste minimization) and life-cycle consequences than
on end-of-pipe or stack controls”); Stenzel, supra note 281, at 256 (2000) (“Businesses want to move
away from command and control regulations that focus on ‘end of the pipe,’ single-medium pollution
control.”); Lisa Mazzie Vela, State of Wisconsin v. Chrysler Outboard Corp.: How Long a Reach for
Environmental Laws?, 6 Wis. Envtl. L.J. 65, 100 (1999) (contending that the command-and-control
approach can regulate “how much oozy green stuff can come out of the end of the pipe into the river
or how much thick chemical-laden smoke can belch out of the stack” but cannot address more
complex environmental problems).
283. Representative examples from my database of the kinds of articles coded “uniform” include:
William A. Anderson, II & Eric P. Gotting, Taken In over Intake Structures? Section 316(b) of the
Clean Water Act, 26 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 1, 73 (2001) (explaining that command-and-control
approaches “apply uniformly to all industries”); Daryl K. Brown, Street Crime, Corporate Crime, and
the Contingency of Criminal Liability, 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1295, 1304 (2001) (arguing that
environmental command-and-control regulation “ignore[d] the enormous differences among plants
and industries and . . . require[d] the same technology in diverse areas—regardless of whether they
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286

Information: Information critiques argue against command-andcontrol regulation on the ground that regulators lack information held by
regulated entities that is essential to effectively dispatching their jobs.
This makes regulation both costly and ill-informed, or, as one article put
it, “the government is constantly expending resources refining its
standards while virtually always remaining several steps behind current
287
developments.”
288
Interest Group: This code identifies articles arguing that agencies
are captured by private interests. So, for instance, typical articles make
arguments along the lines that command-and-control regulation is
289
particularly susceptible to “capture by special interests,” and that
command-and-control programs exploit “groups’ dependency on federal
290
monies to convert them into supporters of federal measures.”
[we]re polluted or clean, populated or empty, or expensive or cheap to clean up” (alteration in
original) (quoting Cass R. Sunstein, After the Rights Revolution 87 (1990))); David A. Dana,
Innovations in Environmental Policy: The New “Contractarian” Paradigm in Environmental
Regulation, 2000 U. Ill. L. Rev. 35, 37 (arguing that command-and-control approaches are “clumsy,”
“one-shoe-fits-all solutions”); Ruth A. Moore, Controlling Agricultural Nonpoint Source Pollution:
The New York Experience, 45 Drake L. Rev. 103, 114 (1997) (arguing that we need regulatory
“flexibility rather than a one-size-fits-all prescription”); Nicholas M. White, Note, Industry-Based
Solutions to Industry-Specific Pollution: Finding Sustainable Solutions to Pollution from Livestock
Waste, 15 Colo. J. Int’l Envtl. L. & Pol’y 153, 158 (2004) (“The main problem with the regulatory
models that have emerged worldwide is that they rely on a single-medium command-and-control
model that fails to take into account the unique quality of the industry being regulated, and the
pollution generated by that industry.”).
284. Dana, supra note 283, at 37.
285. White, supra note 283, at 158.
286. Representative examples from my database of the kinds of articles coded “information”
include: John A. Barrett, Jr., The Global Environment and Free Trade: A Vexing Problem and a
Taxing Solution, 76 Ind. L.J. 829, 836–37 (2001) (“[Under a command and control system], the
government is constantly expending resources refining its standards while virtually always remaining
several steps behind current developments.”); Cohen & Rubin, supra note 199, at 187 (explaining that
the command-and-control system of auto safety regulation requires an “enormous volume of technical
and economic data”); Sonya Dewan, Emissions Trading: A Cost-Effective Approach to Reducing
Nonpoint Source Pollution, 15 Fordham Envtl. L. Rev. 233, 241 (2004) (“Obtaining the information
needed to regulate nonpoint sources is usually more costly under a command and control system than
in a trading program.”); Joel F. Handler, Community Care for the Frail Elderly: A Theory of
Empowerment, 50 Ohio St. L.J. 541, 543 (1989) (suggesting that it has been difficult to protect nursing
home residents through command-and-control regulation because “nursing home regulatory agencies
have the full burden of generating all of the information on quality of care issues”); Stephen M.
Johnson, Economics v. Equity: Do Market-Based Environmental Reforms Exacerbate Environmental
Injustice?, 56 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 111, 112 (1999) (arguing that command-and-control regulation
“imposes unreasonable information-gathering burdens” on regulators); Thomas O. McGarity & Karl
O. Bayer, Federal Regulation of Emerging Genetic Technologies, 36 Vand. L. Rev. 461, 483 (1983)
(“The command and control approach requires the standard-setter to be very familiar with the
operations and vocabulary of the regulated enterprise and the nature of its unwanted effects so that
the standards can proscribe ‘bad’ conduct without unduly inhibiting ‘good’ conduct.”); Nash, supra
note 217, at 528 (arguing that command-and-control regulation is ineffective because regulators have
“limited familiarity with the relevant production processes and technologies”).
287. Barrett, supra note 286, at 836–37.
288. A.H. Barnett & Timothy D. Terrell, Economic Observations on Citizen Suit Provisions of
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291

Ineffective: Finally, articles designated by this code address the
efficacy of regulation. These articles argue that command-and-control
regulation simply does not work or, worse, that it may be “futile or self292
defeating.”
In addition, I coded the articles for the twelve most common
reforms they proposed, including: deregulation, liability-based regulation,
markets, incentives, regulatory taxes, trading schemes, subsidies,
voluntary or “beyond compliance” programs, self-policing or internal
compliance monitoring, information disclosure, contractual regulation,
and stakeholder participation. Under my coding protocol, I included in a
given code any article excerpt that discussed one of these reforms,
regardless of whether the excerpt advocated, denigrated, or simply
acknowledged the reform as a possibility. I use this coding approach both
to minimize interpretive difficulties and to reflect the universe of viable
reforms that was a part of the dialogue at any given time. In this way, my
methodology is designed to capture the appearance and overall salience
of ideas in the debate.

Environmental Legislation, 12 Duke Envtl. L & Pol’y F. 1, 21 (2001) (“Command and control,
technology-based regulation is thus a cartelizing influence on industry, resulting in economic rents for
the regulated.”); Peerenboom, supra note 207, at 170 (“[P]ublic choice proponents demonstrated that
agencies at times put their own institutional interests ahead of the public interest and were susceptible
to influence by special interests.”); Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Comment, Emissions Allowance Trading Under
the Clean Air Act: A Model for Future Environmental Regulations?, 7 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 352, 357
(1999) (“Existing polluters, their trade groups, and organized labor may all favor a command-andcontrol regulation that serves to favor or disfavor certain pollution sources because strategic lobbying
can provide competitive advantages that tradable permits may obviate.”).
289. Valerie Watnick, Risk Assessment: Obfuscation of Policy Decisions in Pesticide Regulation
and the EPA’s Dismantling of the Food Quality Protection Act’s Safeguards for Children, 31 Ariz. St.
L.J. 1315, 1361 (1999).
290. Richard B. Stewart, Madison’s Nightmare, 57 U. Chi. L. Rev. 335, 341 (1990).
291. Representative examples from my database of the kinds of articles coded “ineffective”
include: Kenneth Forton, Expanding the Effectiveness of the Massachusetts Comprehensive Permit Law
by Eliminating Its Subsidy Requirement, 28 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 651, 681 (2001) (arguing that
efforts to produce affordable housing through command-and-control regulation instead produced
“poorly maintained, crime ridden high-rise housing projects”); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Into the
Woods: Broadcasters, Bureaucrats, and Children’s Television Programming, 45 Duke L.J. 1193, 1243
(1996) (contending that command-and-control regulation of children’s television programming is
“unlikely to succeed in a larger sense”); Peerenboom, supra note 207, at 253 (concluding that
command-and-control regulation “produced poor results”); Alison Rieser, Prescriptions for the
Commons: Environmental Scholarship and the Fishing Quotas Debate, 23 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 393,
399 (1999) (referring to the “relentless and futile cycle” command-and-control regulation has created
in fisheries management); Cass R. Sunstein, Paradoxes of the Regulatory State, 57 U. Chi. L. Rev. 407,
418 (1990) (“Command and control regulation of new pollution sources creates incentives to use
existing facilities longer, with harmful consequences for the environment.”); Wood, supra note 231, at
151 (arguing that command-and-control approaches to environmental regulation “have failed to
deliver the hoped-for environmental and social improvements”).
292. Cass R. Sunstein, Political Equality and Unintended Consequences, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 1390,
1411 (1994).
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To ensure that this approach has not unwittingly masked a
groundswell of critique of self-regulatory approaches, I reviewed each of
the articles coded “self-regulation” individually for their normative
valence. Of the 263 articles that discuss self-regulation, 50% (131)
explicitly support self-regulatory programs, 45% (119) mention selfregulation descriptively without arguing for or against it, and only 5%
(13) explicitly criticize self-regulation. As with the arguments described
above, I code reforms conservatively, or “against” my ultimate
conclusions. As I discuss below, the coding of “market-based regulation,”
in particular, is extremely generous, including all articles that merely
mention the term “markets” or “incentives” as a tool of regulation.
Accordingly, to the extent my coding protocol is overbroad in the other
areas, this would only strengthen my findings about the predominance of
self-regulation in the regulatory reform debate.
As I discuss in the text of the Article, I categorized these reforms into
four categories: deregulation, liability-based regulation, market-based
regulation, and self-regulation.
The deregulation code is synonymous with the deregulation
category. Articles are coded “deregulation” if they discuss deregulation
by name, or if they talk about the repeal of laws and regulations or the
293
withdrawal of legal authority from administrative agencies.
Liability-based regulation similarly represents both a reform
proposal as well as a distinct category of reform that looks to the tort
294
system to regulate private conduct.

293. Examples of articles coded “deregulation” include: Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Administrative Law
in a Global Era: Progress, Deregulatory Change, and the Rise of the Administrative Presidency,
73 Cornell L. Rev. 1101 (1989); John R.E. Bliese, Conservative Principles and Environmental
Policies, 7 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y, 1, 1 (1998); Theodore M. Hagelin & Kurt A. Wimmer, Broadcast
Deregulation and the Administrative Responsibility to Monitor Policy Change: An Empirical Study of
the Elimination of Logging Requirements, 38 Fed. Comm. L.J. 201 (1986); Joel I. Klein, Antitrust
Enforcement in the Twenty-First Century, 32 Conn. L. Rev. 1065 (2000); Arnold J. Reitze, Jr., State and
Federal Command-and-Control Regulation of Emissions from Fossil-Fuel Electric Power Generating
Plants, 32 Envtl. L. 369 (2002); Richard B. Stewart, Evaluating the New Deal, 22 Harv. J.L. & Pub.
Pol’y 239 (1998); Michael A. de Gennaro, Note, Oil Pollution Liability and Control Under
International Maritime Law: Market Incentives as an Alternative to Government Regulation, 37 Vand.
J. Transnat’l L. 265 (2004).
294. Examples of articles coded “liability-based regulation” include: J. William Futrell,
Environmental Ethics, Legal Ethics, and Codes of Professional Responsibility, 27 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 825
(1994); Jeremy Nathan Jungreis, “Permit” Me Another Drink: A Proposal for Safeguarding the Water
Rights of Federal Lands in the Regulated Riparian East, 29 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 369 (2005); David
Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A “Public Law” Vision of the Tort
System, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 849 (1984); Richard B. Stewart, Crisis in Tort Law? The Institutional
Perspective, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 184 (1987); Bruce Yandle & Andrew P. Morriss, The Technologies of
Property Rights: Choice Among Alternative Solutions to Tragedies of the Commons, 28 Ecology L.Q.
123 (2001); Todd J. Zywicki, Environmental Externalities and Political Externalities: The Political
Economy of Environmental Regulation and Reform, 73 Tul. L. Rev. 845 (1999).
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Market-based regulation encompasses a number of specific kinds of
reforms, including: trading schemes in which regulators create and
oversee a market in pollution credits that can be freely traded among
295
296
regulated firms, regulatory taxes, and articles that mention the use of
297
“markets” or “incentives” as regulatory tools.
Finally, self-regulation encompasses programs that shift responsibility
for traditionally governmental functions like standard setting,
monitoring, and enforcement to regulated entities or to the broader
community of regulatory beneficiaries. This category includes voluntary
or “beyond compliance” programs sponsored by agencies or by private298
299
self-policing or internal compliance monitoring;
sector groups;
information-based regulatory schemes that seek to mobilize private
300
citizens to enforce standards of conduct on regulated entities; and
stakeholder participation programs that shift standard-setting or
301
enforcement responsibilities to private citizens.

295. Examples of articles in my sample that discuss trading as a regulatory tool include: Gary E.
Marchant, Global Warming: Freezing Carbon Dioxide Emissions: An Offset Policy for Slowing Global
Warming, 22 Envtl. L. 623 (1992); William F. Pedersen, Using Federal Environmental Regulations to
Bargain for Private Land Use Control, 21 Yale J. on Reg. 1 (2004); Richard B. Stewart,
Environmental Quality as a National Good in a Federal State, 1997 U. Chi. Legal F. 199; Brennan Van
Dyke, Note, Emissions Trading to Reduce Acid Deposition, 100 Yale L.J. 2707 (1991).
296. Examples of articles in my sample that discuss tax as a regulatory tool include: E. Donald
Elliott, Goal Analysis Versus Institutional Analysis of Toxic Compensation Systems, 73 Geo. L.J. 1357
(1985); Nathaniel O. Keohane et al., The Choice of Regulatory Instruments in Environmental Policy,
22 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 313 (1998); Stewart, A New Generation, supra note 216; Swenson, supra note
199; Robert R.M. Verchick, Feathers or Gold?: A Civic Economics for Environmental Law, 25 Harv.
Envtl. L. Rev. 95 (2001); Edith Brown Weiss, AGORA: Trade and Environment: Free International
Trade and Protection of the Environment: Irreconcilable Conflict?, 86 Am. J. Int’l L. 700 (1992); Bruce
Yandle, Creative Destruction and Environmental Law, 10 Penn St. Envtl. L. Rev. 155 (2002).
297. Examples of articles in my sample that discuss markets or incentives as regulatory tools
include: Cohen & Rubin, supra note 199; Elliott, supra note 199; Havighurst, supra note 199; Lazarus,
supra note 199; Nordhaus & Danish, supra note 199; Sargentich, supra note 199; Briggs, supra note
199; Swenson, supra note 199; Yelin-Kefer, supra note 199.
298. See supra notes 201, 202.
299. See supra note 203.
300. See supra note 208.
301. See supra notes 205, 207.

